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ABSTRACT
Evaluating the Effect of Merit Aid as a Higher Education 
Policy Tool Using Time Series Analysis
by
Michelle Johanna Nilson
Dr. Mario Martinez, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Higher Education 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Since 1991, seventeen states have dramatically altered the criteria they use to 
distribute student financial aid to include a larger proportion of merit-based awards. 
Across these states, the amounts and lengths of the awards vary. There are states, such as 
Georgia and Florida, which provide full tuition and fees for four or five years, depending 
on the program of study. In sharp contrast, Michigan’s Merit Award Scholarship is a one 
time $2,500 award. States also differ in terms of the selection criteria used to award 
merit aid.
Using a quasi-experimental interrupted and pooled time series design derived 
from research on public budgeting, this research investigates the linkage between merit 
aid and participation by sector (public and private) and level (two- and four-year) in 
states and institutions. In this study, merit aid is characterized into three main categories; 
full tuition, partial tuition, and one-time payment of awards. Interrupted time series is 
applied to these three categories, to discern whether there are differences in merit aid 
programs and their effects on enrollment by sector and level. In addition, pooled time
iii
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series analysis is utilized to examine the effeets of these programs by aid eategory aeross 
states, sectors and levels.
Findings indicate that the adoption of a merit aid policy significantly changed 
enrollment in 9 of the 15 states investigated in this study. While the results were mixed, 
generally, states experienced a greater long term positive effect than negative or short 
term effects, indicating that more students take advantage of the programs over time.
Full tuition payment policies had a short term significant effect on enrollment in the 4- 
year public sector analysis. However, partial tuition payment policies had a significant 
positive long and short term effect on the 2-year public sector. This finding supports 
earlier work that theorized that merit aid encourages students who might not otherwise 
enroll to do so.
IV
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The principle of rewarding students for their success and hard work is not a novel 
idea. High performing students are rewarded with opportunities to participate in many 
activities from attendance at exclusive and highly selective schools, honors programs, 
and internships, to receiving private scholarships to support their endeavors. A recent 
state policy development in the reward system for high achieving students is merit based 
financial aid for postsecondary students. The need for continual, additional and new 
approaches that examine merit aid and its effects on participation is heightened by the 
tendency of states to “copy” policies from other states. Legislators, in particular in states 
surrounding Georgia, adopted similar merit aid policies as Georgia’s 1993 first broadly 
available state merit aid program, in hopes of reaping some of the same benefits that they 
saw in Georgia (Cohen-Vogel & Ingle, 2006; McLendon, Heller, & Young 2005).
A recent examination by the Education Commission of the States found that since 
1993, seventeen states have begun to reward meritorious students with financial aid 
(ECS, 2005). However, prior to 1993, the main criteria for student financial aid awards 
were financial need, with less than 10 percent of grant dollars going to merit aid (Heller, 
2004). The three main purposes behind this legislation are to: 1) keep the best students in 
the state, 2) reward and encourage their hard work, and 3) promote college access and 
attainment (Heller, 2002).
1
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Although states may emulate polieies from eaeh other, merit aid is a term that 
now encompasses a wide variety of student financial aid policies enacted across the 
states. On one end of the spectrum, there are states that award full tuition, fees, and even 
book money, as in the case of the Georgia HOPE scholarship. On the other end of the 
spectrum is Michigan’s Merit Scholarship award, which is a one-time $2500 payment. 
Between these two extremes are several programs, such as the ones in Nevada, Missouri, 
and Mississippi, which pay on average up to $2,500 per year, with lifetime award limits 
of around $10,000 each.
There are relatively few studies that examine the full impact of these different 
types of polieies on participation across all of the states, in part due to their relatively new 
arrival on the public policy scene. In a recent study using Census 2000 data from seven 
Southern states’ merit aid programs, Dynarski (2003) found that the introduction of a 
merit aid program increased the probably of enrolling in postsecondary education by 5 to 
7 percentage points. Each of the states in her study was in the South and they all had 
similar policies regarding the amounts of aid.
Other studies, which examine individual state programs, have met with mixed 
results. For example, Cornwell and Mustard (2003b) found that in states where tuition, 
student fees, and books are paid for, there was a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state; Heller (2003) found that in Michigan, where the award is limited, the incentive 
effects are marginal. However, the wide variety o f  merit aid programs and their different 
impacts on participation by sector (public and private) and level (two- and four-year) 
remains unexamined. In her 2004 dissertation, Patricia Farrell conducted a
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comprehensive evaluation of existing merit aid policies at the state level and 
recommended further study of their impact on institutions, levels, and sectors.
Statement of the Problem 
Given that merit aid has not provided a clear incentive effect in all of the states 
where it was adopted, there is some debate as to whether policy makers should look to 
merit financial aid programs to provide incentives for students. One issue that remains is 
that, upon examination of the debates about merit aid, there is little differentiation 
between types of merit aid programs and their corresponding effects on enrollment over 
time. This study is a longitudinal investigation of the impact of the different types of 
merit aid programs and their impact on enrollment by sector and level.
The literature on public policy can be instrumental in building an understanding 
of long term state finance policy changes. Public policy scholars routinely examine large 
scale interventions, such as programs similar to the merit aid grants. One such technique 
that has been useful in determining the impact of an intervention is the use of time series 
analysis. This type of post-hoc analysis is a longitudinal examination of patterns before 
and after an intervention, often using secondary data sets. Time series analysis has a long 
history of use in economics, public health and epidemiology, agriculture sciences, 
psychology, business, and public policy (Taggart, 1989).
Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of merit aid on first time 
tfeshman enrollment by sector (private, non-profit and public institutions) and level (2-
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year and 4-year institutions) in the twelve states that have had the policy for more than 
five years. Since policymakers in neighboring states often adopt policies that are similar, 
the merit aid policies were characterized into three types:
1. Full tuition and benefits;
2. Partial tuition for entire program; and
3. One time payment of partial tuition
The impact of these policies on institutional and state enrollment patterns was 
examined. Characterizing the types of merit aid programs serves to isolate and clarify the 
impact each of the three main types of programs commonly found in the states. In 
addition, the three types of merit aid policy were compared between types of programs to 
determine the relative impact on participation. For example, the full tuition and benefits 
programs were compared to the partial tuition and one time payment for partial tuition 
programs to determine if one of the programs had a larger impact on enrollment.
Significance of the Study
In a recent editorial article. Smart (2005) articulated the attributes of exemplary 
quantitative research. One of the suggestions Smart has for young scholars is that they 
borrow the “best examples of theoretical and methodological paradigms of other 
disciplines to important topics on the higher education research agenda” (p 465). This 
methodological technique is currently utilized largely in public policy (Holmes, M. D., 
Daudistel, H. C. & Taggart, W. A., 1992; Taggart, 1989) and economics; here it is 
transferred to higher education policy in order to analyze merit aid policies across the 
states. Time series analysis is not a new technique; it is a methodology that dates back to
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early agricultural studies and has roots that date back over 400 years (Klein, 1997). This 
approach is novel in that there are few studies that utilize quasi-experimental time series 
techniques in higher education policy analysis.
One final suggestion that Smart has is that research have important implications 
for future research and practice and policy. From this time series analysis—and 
depending on the results of the analysis—a model that can be used in states to project 
their enrollments based on the type of merit aid policy that is adopted will be constructed. 
In addition, this study will inform future research using time series analysis as well as 
higher education policy by contributing to the research using a proven cross-disciplinary 
technique.
The study contributes to the knowledge of merit aid and its effect on enrollment in 
yet a third way. Many authors have investigated from a broad, state perspective, the 
effect of tuition increases or grant amounts on enrollment. The work of Dynarski (2001) 
looked at the impact of grants on enrollment. Others have proposed “standardized price 
response coefficients (SPRCs), which provides an elasticity measure, a change in the 
probability of enrollment for every $100 change in net price (e.g., Jackson &
Weathersby, 1975; Leslie & Brinkman, 1988; McPherson, 1978)” (St. John, Asker, &
Hu, 2001 in Paulsen & Smart, 2001.) Tierney (1980), found that “a $100 increase in 
grant offers by private relative to public institutions would increase the probability that 
such a student matriculates at a private institution to .67” (p. 541). B y examining the 
impact of merit aid on enrollment, this research was able to determine whether significant 
differences in participation exist across programs, which may provide insight into the 
elasticity of merit aid on enrollment.
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Research Questions 
The gaps in the research raise several questions about merit aid programs, and 
their associated policy implications. The following research questions guided the data 
collection and analysis for the study:
State Level Analvsis
1) How has merit aid impacted non-profit postsecondary participation in each of the 
states that has adopted this student financial aid policy?
2) What is the effect of the following three types of merit aid programs on state-level 
parti eipation:
a. Full-tuition programs
b. Partial tuition programs
c. One time payment programs
Sector (Public and Private) and Level (Two- and Four-Year!
3) How has merit aid impacted participation by sector and level in the states that 
have adopted this financial aid policy?
4) What is the effect on enrollment by type of aid program in each sector and level 
within each state?
a. Each state
i. 2-year public
ii. 2-year private
iii. 4-year public
iv. 4-year private
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Limitations of the Study
The following outlines some of the limitations of this study.
• Aggregate and self reported data—the aggregate participation data that were 
used in this study were collected from the National Center for Education 
Statistics’ IPEDS data set. As such, the data are self-reported by the 
institutions in each state and can be incomplete or omit institutions that are in 
the states selected for this study.
• Self selection—as in almost all studies that involve higher education, 
participation was not compulsory and therefore reflects a self-selecting sample 
of the larger population. As such, care must be taken when attempting to 
generalize to the whole population.
• Autocorrelation—there is a high correlation between current freshmen 
enrollment and enrollment in the higher levels. In most states there has been 
an increase in the number of students that are enrolling in postsecondary 
education over the past 20 years (Mortenson, 2006). This increasing trend 
toward enrollment can lead to autocorrelation in enrollment from one year to 
the next. The first way this study limits the effects of this autocorrelation is to 
limit the study to the impact of first time undergraduates only. A test that is 
used to determine if  there is autocorrelation is to check the Durbin-Watson 
statistic for each model that was developed from the time series regression 
equations, which is fully explained in Chapter 3 (Meier and Brudney, 2002).
• Alternative explanations—an assumption of this study was that the change in 
enrollment at the time of the policy implementation was due to the policy
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effects rather than some other explanation. Alternative explanations for 
increased enrollment can be ruled out by increasing the number of cases, 
which is why this study examines similar programs across several states. In 
addition, by looking at the effects of the policy across institutional sectors and 
levels in several states, the number of cases is increased to a point where 
outliers can be identified and explained.
• This study does not differentiate between those students who are residents of 
merit aid states versus those who are not; it was a broad examination of the 
impact of the policy adoption on all first time undergraduate enrollments 
across the state.
• Multicollinearity- due to the nature of time series analysis and the use of 
dummy variables, there were instances where multi collinearity was an issue. 
For example, both the long term impact (TTT) and time (T) trend variables 
were used to determine trends and used counting variables that overlapped in 
their measures. Another example is the high level of correlation between the 
other independent variables, such as the number of high school graduates 
(HSGRAD) and higher education appropriations (HEAPP).
Once a person determines that he or she wants to participate in higher education, 
they face the task of selecting an institution and getting accepted. At eaeh stage of the 
process between determining tbat one wants to go to college and getting in the chair on 
the first day of class, there are factors that weigh into the decisions along that path. The 
college choice, participation, enrollment, matriculation, and participation literature has 
identified several of those factors: parent attainment, socioeconomic status, gender,
8
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race/ethnicity, financial aid, self efficacy, grade point average, standardized test scores, 
and tuition, (Cabrera & La Nasa, 2000; Leslie & Brinkman, 1988; St. John, 1990) to 
name just a few. While this study is about financial aid, which is one factor of many in 
the decision to enroll, this study does not take into account those individual differences 
that can play a role in a person’s decision to enroll. As such, caution should be used 
when trying to generalize this study and its results to the decision of a single person.
Since the merit aid in states can only to be used in not for-profit postsecondary 
institutions, this study examines only the non-profit sector of higher education in the 
United States.
• Van der Klaauw (2002) theorizes that college administrators have little
knowledge about the alternative enticements that are available to students. These 
alternatives can include campus job opportunities, special programming, financial 
aid offers from other institutions, military, external job opportunities, and a host 
of other omitted variables that may play a role in enrollment decisions. He argues 
that since financial aid is a part of the enrollment decision process, it is an 
endogenous, or nested, variable. In this study, each of the states’ postsecondary 
financial aid is awarded to students based on a given set of criterion that students 
are generally aware of ahead of time and they can determine for themselves 
whether or not they qualify for merit for aid. While this study does not control for 
institutional or federal financial aid, the impact of state aid on enrollment is 
reasonably isolated by examining only similar state financial aid programs.
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Definition of Terms
For the purposes of this study, the following definitions are for clarity and to 
ensure a common understanding of terms:
College choice: The decision process and conclusion concerning where one 
should matriculate.
College selection: Part of the deeision proeess where a student eandidate ehooses 
to enroll from among a variety of institutions.
Enrollment: The measure for postsecondary participation, also referred to as 
‘demand’ as represented by those choosing to enroll in postsecondary education (Buss, 
Parker, & Rivenburg, 2004).
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS): A national database 
on postsecondary education that is housed at the National Center for Education Statistics. 
They are institutionally reported data that contain enrollment information.
Level: Describes whether a postsecondary institution offers 2-year, 4-year or 
technical degree programs.
Matriculation: The act of being enrolled as a student in a postsecondary 
educational institution.
Merit-based aid: In this case, it refers to state supported student financial aid 
whose primary criterion for award is merit rather than need.
Participation gap: The difference between the enrollment at the current rate 
(baseline rate) and enrollment at some higher rate set by the benchmark states (Martinez, 
2004).
10
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Participation rate: “the number of students in postsecondary education divided by 
the total population” (Martinez, 2004).
Postsecondary participation: Refers to a person attending a public or private 
degree-granting college or university (Census, 2000).
Sector: Refers to either public or private nonprofit postsecondary institutions
Factors of merit aid programs: The three main factors of merit aid programs are 
award criteria for selection, length of award, and amount of award.
Criteria for selection.- Refers to the criteria used to determine award eligibility, 
typically grade point average, standardized test score, or class rank.
Length of award: Refers to the length of time of the award (semesters).
Amount of award: Refers to the award dollar amount per year.
Categories of merit aid programs: Refers to the broad categorization of merit aid 
programs by award amount (either full tuition, partial, or one-time payment).
Full tuition payment programs: Refers to merit aid student financial aid programs 
that pay for all postsecondary tuition expenses.
Partial tuition payment programs: Refers to merit-based student financial aid 
programs that pay a recurring award for some portion less than 100% of postsecondary 
tuition expenses.
One-time payment programs: Merit aid programs that make a one time payment 
to students for their performance.
11
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter is a review the literature on student financial aid and postsecondary 
participation. State merit aid is the focus of this study and the literature review. The 
initial introduction to the broad issues that underlie financial aid is followed by a brief 
history of student financial aid in the United States. While this study focuses on state 
merit aid programs and their impact on enrollment, it is also important to understand both 
federal and institutional financial aid structures. In addition to providing a fuller 
understanding of the existing structures, an understanding of federal and institutional 
financial aid programs provides context for the state merit aid program structures that are 
currently in place. The balance of the chapter reviews the current literature on state merit 
aid programs. Finally, a brief review of the public policy perspectives related to large 
scale state-wide intervention programs, such as the merit aid programs is provided.
Throughout the reviewed literature cited in this chapter, the underlying theme is 
the interaction between financial aid and its impact on participation. Where it is 
appropriate, the interaction between the aid and participation variables will be reviewed 
in the financial aid literature; where possible, the literature review on participation will be 
covered separately. Additional issues related to aid and participation, such as college 
choice, will be discussed as appropriate.
12
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Student Financial Aid 
There are several factors that influence the decision about whether or not a person 
will go to college. Several researchers (Hossler, Braxton, & Coopersmith, 1989; Hossler 
& Gallagher, 1987; Hossler, Schmit & Vesper, 1999; Kim, 2004; McDonough, 1997; 
Tierney, 1980) have found that financial aid plays a significant role in the choice of 
colleges for students. Cabrera and La Nasa (2000) proposed a model for the college 
choice processes that showed that several factors influence college choice. Among those 
factors were parental characteristics (such as education, income, and occupation, 
collegiate experiences, encouragement, and involvement), student characteristics (ability, 
qualifications, aspirations), and institutional or sector factors (such as availability of 
information, features of potential institutions, and cost of attendance and financial aid) 
(Cabrera & La Nasa, 2000). Of all of the factors identified as playing a role in student 
participation, institutions, governments, and administrators generally have broad 
influence over only two general areas of student participation in higher education— 
admissions and financial aid (Van der Klaauw, 2002). Pema and Titus (2004) add to the 
list of tools within the scope of higher education policy control—tuition, appropriations 
to institutions, and policies related to K-12 preparation for higher education.
Researchers typically examine state and federal financial aid as separate entities— 
the results of which have been mixed. The research on the impact of institutional 
financial aid has found that it has a significant effect on participation (Jackson, 1978; 
Lumina, 2003, 2004). Research on state aid has found that it has a significant impact on 
sectors of the college going population but the size of that impact is mixed, depending 
largely on the amount of award (Heller, 1999; Dynarski, 2000; Kane, 2003). The federal
13
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financial aid research related to student participation has shown a negligible effect at best 
(Maag & Fitzpatrick, 2004; Dynarski, 2003; Heller, 1999). Further, most studies find 
that state financial aid plays a significant role in the decision making process of students 
(Heller, 1997; St. John, et al., 2004). The impact of state aid is particularly significant 
when examining students with low socioeconomic status (Alexander, 2001) or those of 
African American and Hispanic origins (Heller, 1997; Kim, 2004; Stewart & Post, 1990). 
In addition, Sefior and Turner (2002) found that the federal Pell grant played a significant 
effect on the enrollment of adults in higher education. There remain gaps in the literature 
concerning types of financial aid programs and their impact on participation. In addition, 
because state-wide merit based financial aid programs are relatively new policy 
instruments, there is little research available on their effectiveness or impact on student 
participation.
Brief History of Financial Aid in the United States 
While there was institutional student aid grant in place a short seven years after 
the establishment of Harvard University, the first federal student aid program in the US 
was not established until nearly three hundred years later, in 1935. Under the WPA, the 
National Youth Administration (NYA) provided part time jobs for over 700,000 college 
students. This initiative was started as part of the New Deal with the intention of 
providing jobs to youth during a time of economic depression. In its later years, it 
changed its focus to encompass job training for youth assisting in the war effort and was 
eventually abolished in 1943 (The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers).
14
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Shortly after the abolition of the NYA, federal aid was extended to servicemen 
through the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944, or GI Bill of Rights. This was the 
first large scale legislation that allocated money to individuals rather than institutions. 
Gladieux (2003) called the GI Bill “the most important education legislation of the 20^ 
century in the US.” In addition, he credits the GI Bill with inspiring efforts to broaden 
higher education access through subsequent legislation such as the Higher Education Act 
of 1965 and the Pell Grant, passed in the reauthorization of 1972.
Access continued as a goal throughout the 1970s on into the new millennium; 
however, student-financing policy shifted from grants to loans over the past 30 years (St. 
John, 1994). In 1974, the federal government established the Student Loan Marketing 
Association (Sallie Mae) and in 1976, the Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act 
provided for state loan-guarantee agencies—both of which would play a major role in the 
changing landscape of higher education finance for the next 30 years. The legislation of 
the 1990s provided enhanced access to loans for students and parents paying for higher 
education. The 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act provided for deductions to taxpayers for higher 
education interest on loans, provided for Lifelong Learning tax credits. Education IRAs, 
section 529 plans. Federal Hope Scholarship, and tax exclusions for employer paid 
contributions to education (FinAid, 2005).
One of the current issues in federal financial aid circles surrounds lending 
policies. It is of concern for many reasons. According to Gladieux and Pema (2005), 
lending has increased to nearly 50 percent of all entering freshmen and to nearly two- 
thirds of those entering four-year colleges. Perhaps most disturbing, nearly one-fifth of
15
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those students drop out with significant loan debt and nearly one-fourth of borrowers who 
dropped out defaulted on at least one loan. (Gladieux & Pema, 2005).
Federal Student Financial Aid 
There are three main ways in which the federal government provides financial aid 
to students: loans, grants, and work-study. According to Martinez (2005), studies on the 
impact of federal financial aid on participation focus primarily on two main questions: 1) 
Who participates? And 2) Where do they participate in higher education? These 
questions are intermingled in the research through various studies of choice, sector 
participation, and participation by race and gender. St. John (1991) conducted a review 
of the research literature and found that student aid programs are an effective mechanism 
for encouraging equal educational opportunity but that reductions in federal grant dollars 
have contributed to the participation gap of minority students to higher education. A 
more recent study by Ruppert (2003) supports the finding that there is a persistent gap in 
minority participation in higher education.
The impact of student financial aid on enrollment is mixed, largely because of the 
different types of aid that are available. Jackson’s 1978 study of grant aid and student 
enrollment found that students “awarded $ 1 0 0  more aid were 0 .1  percentage points more 
likely to attend than otherwise similar nonapplicants.” He goes on to state that his data 
imply that, “the award of aid is more important than the amount,” although he does warn 
against the generalizability of this finding to other students who received dissimilar 
amounts of awards. Heller (1997, 1999) and Leslie and Brinkman (1988) confirmed that 
students respond to financial grant aid awards and tuition pricing and that the responses
16
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vary by race and ethnicity. A more recent study by Dynarski (2001) on the elimination of 
the Social Security Student Benefits Program found that “offering $1,000 ($1997) of 
grant aid increases educational attainment by .2 0  years and the probability of attending 
college by five percentage points.”
Using the National Postsecondary Education Student Aid Survey of 1986-87, St. 
John & Starkey (1995) found that certain types of grant aid were negatively associated 
with persistence for low-income students. In addition, they found that, “the amount of 
work study awarded was significantly and negatively associated with persistence by 
lower-middle-income students.” St. John and Starkey argue that the cause may be that, 
“the average grant award was apparently insufficient relative to the average tuition charge 
facing the low-income student” (p. 173). Similarly, Spaulding (2003) found that at the 
University of Washington, federal student loans and federal work-study had a negative 
influence on the student’s decision to enroll. This combination of federal student loans 
and work-study is referred to as “student self help.” The reliance on these policies of 
“student self help” has disparate impact on low SES students, who are eligible for work- 
study programs. The benefits of work-study, as demonstrated by increased involvement 
on campus, retention and the like must be supported by additional grant funding rather 
than loans in order to encourage these students to persist through to graduation.
Institutional Student Financial Aid 
The first recorded financial aid is a scholarship established by Lady Anne 
Radcliffe Mowlson in 1643 at Harvard University (FinAid, 2005). Since that time, 
institutional aid has grown to nearly $23 Billion, or nearly one quarter of all financial aid
17
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granted to students (see Figure 1 below). One of the tools that institutions have to 
influence the composition of an incoming fi-eshman class is the financial aid packages it 
has to offers students (Thistlethwaite, 1958; Epple, Romano, & Sieg, 2002; van der 
Klaauw, 2002). Typically institutional financial aid is used to get a subset of those 
admitted, especially those with the greatest academic ability, to enroll.
Private grants, scholarships, and loans are a category that is truly impossible to 
determine the full amount of private financial aid distributed nationally to students. 
Despite the gaps in the data on private grants, the Institute for Higher Education Policy 
conducted a survey to approximate the amounts given in the 2003-2004 academic year, 
and determined that somewhere around $3 billion, with estimates as low as a $450 
million to as high as $13Billion (see Figure 1 below). The most recent NCES survey 
only had less than 600 respondents to the private grant question, of which they 
interviewed a sample (Institute for Higher Education Policy, 2005). To date, there is no 
comprehensive research on the number of private scholarships or the amount of the 
awards and their impact on access or participation in higher education.
Institutional Responses to State and Federal Aid 
The limited numbers of studies that have accounted for the interactions between 
institutional, state and federal aid tend to focus on the institutional response to changes in 
either state or federal polieies. For example, Aeosta (2001) examined the response of 
colleges to changes in federal financial aid. She found that private institutions increased 
the amounts of their tuition and institutional aid to students, whereas public institutions 
increased tuition revenues and decreased student aid (Acosta, 2001). Similarly, Long
18
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(2003) found that comparable institutional strategies to capture revenues were employed 
in Georgia with the implementation of the HOPE Scholarship.
Figure 1. Estimated Student Aid by Source for Academic Year 2003-04
Institutional Aid ($23B)
Private Aid ($3B)
Nonfederal Loans ($1 IB)
Education Tax Benefits ($6B)
Other Federal Programs ($4B)
Federal Campus-Based ($3B)
State Aid ($6B)
Federal Pell Grants ($13B)
- - , j Federal Loans ($56B)
Source: Institute for Higher Education Policy Survey, 2004-05; College Board, 2004
Research on the interaction between university policies and state merit aid 
policies has shown that institutions utilize awards to attract students with high academic 
achievement rather than closing the gap in need based financial aid left by statewide 
merit aid programs (Doyle, Delaney & Naughton, 2004). The implications of these 
findings for policy makers and administrators are significant. Both need to be fully 
aware of the impact of their policies on the entire student population and the compound 
affect it can have on students of low SES, who are most in need of financial aid.
19
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
State Merit Based Student Financial Aid
There are two main ways that states provide financial aid to students: through 
loans and through need and merit based grants. The impact of state aid is particularly 
significant when examining students with low SES (Alexander, 2001) or those of African 
American and Hispanic origins (Heller, 1997). All 17 of the states that have adopted 
broad-based merit scholarships have at least one of the following goals for its program: 1 . 
promote college access and attainment, 2 . encourage, and/or reward students for working 
hard, 3. reduce “brain drain” in the state by encouraging students to obtain their degrees 
in the state where they live (Heller, 2002). (See Appendix A for details on each of the 
states’ awards).
Until the late 1980s, only a small proportion of state appropriations were allocated 
for merit-based funding to students (Cornwell, Mustard & Sridhar, 2003). The first merit 
based financial aid program was the Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship, 
introduced in 1991 by then Governor, Bill Clinton. However, since it’s inception in the 
early 1990s, Georgia’s Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) Scholarship 
has led the way to increasing state supported broad-based merit scholarships.* According 
to a survey conducted by the Education Commission of the States, as of 2005, there were 
17 states that had merit based scholarships similar to the one established by Georgia (see 
Appendix A for complete program descriptions). The transition fi-om funding need-based 
scholarships to merit-based has been a relatively swift one, as it proves to be a politically 
popular tool used in election bids for legislators in this era of growing accountability
' Georgia has both a HOPE Scholarship and a HOPE Grant. The HOPE Grant applies only to 
non-degree programs and does not have a GPA requirement. Since the incentives that apply to 
merit aid do not apply to the HOPE Grant, this smdy does not examine that component of the 
Georgia Scholarship system.
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(Dynarski, 2003). In 2000, the twelve states (at that time) with merit-based aid awarded 
over $863 million in merit based aid and $308 million in need based aid in the 2000-01 
academic year (Heller, 2002).
The combination of eligibility requirements, source of funding, and award 
amounts in each state are the largest factors in determining the impact of each scholarship 
program. In a state where there is limited funding, it makes sense to have more stringent 
restrictions on who is awarded, in order to make the money last longer. A state might 
also reduce the amount of funding per student in order to stretch tight dollars. In states 
where the revenues are tied to state funding, such as in Louisiana and South Carolina, 
there is a larger impact on funding during years where state fiscal budgets are tight 
(Dynarski, 2002). States where lottery proceeds are the funding source, there is a 
disproportionate amount paid in to the fund and very little returned to low socioeconomic 
sectors of the state, which also generally tends to over-represent minorities (Binder, et.al., 
2003; Cornwell & Mustard, 2003b). Arkansas has had to limit new enrollees and West 
Virginia had to cut need-based aid because it was based on the state’s budget whereas the 
merit-based aid was based on lottery proceeds (Dynarski, 2003). A recent visit to the 
website for the Washington merit scholarship program revealed that the Washington 
Promise Scholarship program was terminated on June 30, 2006 (Washington Higher 
Education Coordinating Board, 2006).
Eligibility for the wide reaching merit based state scholarships vary widely from 
state to state. In Michigan, eligibility is solely based on a standardized test that is given 
in 11*'’ grade. In Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and West Virginia, the criteria for award 
is based on grade point average and standardized test scores. Wyoming has the strictest
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criteria for awards with both a high academic achievement requirement and high need 
criterion. As a result of their high eligibility requirements, Wyoming only awards 
between four and six awards annually. In Georgia, Kentucky, Nevada, and New Mexico 
recipients are awarded solely based on grade point averages. Finally, Alaska awards its 
scholars based on class rank. Basing awards on class rank is significant because “blacks 
have lower average grades in high school, which means a smaller proportion will meet 
HOPE’S academic requirements: nationwide, among those members of the high school 
class of 1992 intending to go to college, 21 percent of whites had a high school GPA of 
3.5 or above, while only 4 percent of blacks had such higher grades (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 1995)” (Dynarski, 2002).
The effect of award amounts has varied. In the case of Georgia, where the award 
is significant and includes not only tuition but student fees and books; the effect has been 
a significant shift towards students staying in state (Cornwell & Mustard, 2003b). 
Because Georgia’s awards are based on lottery revenues, the state could, until recently, 
well afford to pay for tuition, fees and books for students. One study by Cornwell and 
Mustard (2002) theorized that due to the high correlation between pre-college academic 
achievement and family income, HOPE scholarship funds would be capitalized in other 
ways besides tuition. They found that “doubling any county’s HOPE scholarship 
recipients would, on average, lead to a two percent rise in the number of registered cars” 
(Cornwell & Mustard, 2002).
In states where funding for the scholarship is limited, like Michigan, (which also 
uses tobacco settlement dollars), the total award is $2500. There has been little incentive 
effect in this state (Heller & Rogers, 2003); perhaps this is due in part because it is a one
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time, non-renewable award. The Nevada Millennium Scholarship, with its funding base 
in the limited tobacco dollars, had to make adjustments in terms of requirements for 
awards and individual allotments during the 2005 legislative session (Ackerman, 2005). 
More recent legislative changes to the program cut funding to students taking remedial 
courses.
The results concerning the first goal of promoting college access and attainment 
have been mixed. Dynarski (2003) found that generally, the new merit-based scholarship 
programs increase participation in states by five to seven percentage points. On the other 
hand, she also found that in the case of Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship, there was a 
widening of the participation gap between blacks and whites. She speculated it was due, 
at least in part, to the original stringent criteria placed on students in the HOPE 
Scholarship.
In New Mexico, where tuition prices are also low. Binder, Ganderton, arid 
Hutchins (2003) found that the New Mexico Success Scholarship did not increase 
participation in that state for in-state students, but did increase participation for Native 
American students. They also found that the scholarship tended to disproportionately 
award white affluent students. In Nevada, early data indicate that the Nevada high school 
continuation rate for first-time, degree-seeking college students in the fall semester 
immediately following graduation increased from 32.4% in 1992 to 44.7% in 2002 
(Herzog, 2005). While these numbers are encouraging for the future of Nevada, it 
remains below the 2002 national average of 56.6% for this age group (NCHEMS, 2005).
The final measure of impact of merit-based scholarships is that of “brain drain.” 
While there is evidence that students tend to stay in their home state when incentives are
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offered, such as in the case of Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship (Cornwell & Mustard, 2002) 
there is little research into the long-term retention of these citizens. Heller and Rogers 
(2003) found that Michigan’s $2500 incentive did little to provide encouragement for 
students to study harder, achieve more, or to pursue higher education in the state. They 
offer as a warning to policymakers that it is still not known how much of an incentive is 
necessary to retain students or how to focus incentives towards those students that might 
benefit from an incentive system of rewards.
While several studies focus on the impact of a specific merit aid policy, none have 
examined the aggregate impact of these policies in the states where they have been 
adopted. In addition, the operational definition of merit aid remains broad and indicates 
nothing more than the general criteria for award; this study seeks to deconstruct merit aid 
programs and to estimate the impact of three broad characterizations of merit aid on 
participation.
Postsecondary Participation 
The pathway to college can take many different routes. For some, it includes 
years of planning, including taking college preparation coursework; for others, it is a 
decision that they make just before the start of a semester. This study is specifically 
interested in examining the patterns of enrollment across states and institutions as they 
are affected by merit-based aid and is not eoneemed about the process that students go 
through in deciding whether to go to college.
Throughout the literature, enrollment is referred to in many different ways. For 
example, within an economic framework, enrollment is referred to as ‘demand’, as
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represented by those choosing to enroll in postsecondary education (Buss, Parker, & 
Rivenburg, 2004). Other literature equates college choice with opportunity and access, 
especially with regards to the long term impacts of where one decides to go to college 
and future career opportunities (Gladieux & Swail, 1999; Thomas, 2003). In her 2004 
study on the impact of financial aid on college choice by racial groups, Kim (2004) found 
that the college choices of African American and Hispanic students were not significantly 
influenced by financial aid. However, Whites and Asian American students were more 
likely to enroll in their first choice college, given grants or loans or some combination of 
the two.
The impact of financial aid on college choice by sector has been examined in 
several studies (Jackson, 1978; Tierney, 1980; Pema & Titus, 2004). In their study on 
the impact of cost, quality, and enrollment demand. Buss, Parker, and Rivenburg (2004) 
found that increasing financial aid had a large positive effect on enrollment for students 
who receive that aid. However, if tuition also increased, student enrollment would 
decrease. “Students appear to look beyond a ‘net cost’ number and consider tuition and 
aid separately. Perhaps this reflects uncertainty about continuation of aid in future years, 
whereas ‘tuition is forever” (p. 65). Jackson’s 1978 study found that the mere offer of 
financial aid, regardless of amount, weighed significantly on the college choice decision. 
Pema and Titus (2004) found that, “state need-based finaneial aid and institutional 
financial aid promote student choice among different types of colleges and universities. 
State need-based financial aid programs with relatively large awards per member of the 
traditional college-age population appear to be particularly effective at promoting 
enrollment in private four-year colleges and universities in a state” (p. 520).
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It is largely assumed that states that offer financial aid programs might improve 
their participation rates. Participation rates are “the number of students in postsecondary 
education divided by the total population” (Martinez, 2004). By investigating the 
relationship between merit aid and participation, it may be possible to predict how 
participation rates would be affected in the future. There has been some work done on 
projecting state participation rates. For example, in his study of postsecondary 
participation and state policy, Martinez (2004) proposed that states set benchmarks for 
improving their postsecondary participation rates based on the states with the highest 
participation rates. He found that if states maintained their current participation rates, the 
top five states with the largest projected gaps for 2015 were located in the Southeast. The 
participation gap is defined as the differenee between the current eollege participation 
rate in the state and that of a benchmark state. There is growing concern that while the 
number of students enrolling in postsecondary education is increasing due to population 
growth, the percentage of the population enrolling in postsecondary education is not 
(Ruppert, 2003). Interestingly, four of the five states with the largest projected 
enrollment gaps currently have merit based student financial aid programs in place: West 
Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi. It may be possible that the effect of the 
merit aid programs in these states would alter the projections that Martinez offers.
There is an established body of literature that points to the relationship between 
financial aid and student enrollment; in partieular, “who benefits?” and “where do they 
go?” The impact of merit aid policies has not been examined to determine how they 
effect first time undergraduate enrollment on the state and student levels. Additionally, 
there is little evidence as to the impact of merit aid on enrollment across the states with
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similar policies to determine if the effect is similar. This study seeks to fill that gap in 
the research by examining the impact of merit aid on enrollment across similar merit aid 
policies at the state and sector levels.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the analytical procedures used in this study 
and contains the following sections: Introduction, research questions, independent 
variable description, methods of analysis, and summary. First, an explanation of the 
methods that were used in this study, the sources of error for this type of analysis, and 
how the errors were controlled for are outlined. Then, the research questions and the 
corresponding hypotheses are provided. Drawn from the hypotheses, each of the 
dependent and independent variables utilized in the hypotheses are identified and defined. 
Finally, a description of each of the analyses that was conducted for each research 
questions is provided. Then, the four main types of impact found as a result of this type 
of analysis are examined. Finally, the regression equations and assumptions are 
presented along with data limitations.
Main Methods
The main methods of analysis that were utilized in this study are interrupted and 
pooled time series regression analysis. In addition, all regressions were checked for 
autocorrelation using the Durbin-Watson statistic. Interrupted time series is useful when 
examining a large scale policy adoption, such as the merit aid programs across states.
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According to StatSoft, (2005), there are two main purposes in time series analysis: 1) 
“identifying the nature of the phenomenon represented by the sequence of observations, 
and (b) forecasting (predicting future values of the time series variable)”.
Interrupted time series requires a series of observations of equal spacing before 
and after an event. The first step in interrupted time series is to graph the data to 
determine if there are any trends in the data line. Then, based on the visual inspection of 
the trend line, a regression model is built to determine the impact of the intervention or 
interruption (Meier & Brudney, 2002). Pooled time series is when there are a series of 
observations of equal spacing of equal units. For example, in this study, there were data 
for 1995-2004 reported for the institutions in Michigan. The data across all institutions in 
that state were pooled for each of every year and the multivariate regressions were run on 
the pooled enrollment data.
The data on enrollment in this study were likely to have a positive slope over 
time, as enrollments have generally been increasing in most states over the last 25 years 
(Mortenson, 2001). A concern when conducting time series analysis is that of 
autocorrelation (Ostrom, 1990). Autocorrelation is where data from one year are 
correlated with the prior years. For example, enrollment at institutions and in states is 
generally correlated from one year to the next simply because there are issues of 
population growth and capacity at work. In order to test for autocorrelation, the Durbin- 
Watson statistic for each regression was calculated. In order to reduce some of the 
autocorrelation, this study only examined the enrollment of first time undergraduates. By 
excluding sophomores, juniors, and seniors from the data set, the autocorrelation that 
corresponds with subsequent enrollments is reduced.
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Sources of Error
McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger, and Hay (1980) point out that there are three 
main sources of error in time series; 1) trend; 2) seasonality; and 3) random error. Trend 
is where a time series gradually “drifts upward throughout most of its history” 
(McDowall, et al., p. 15). Seasonality is when a series spikes consistently at a given 
interval of time. Finally, random error is when a “time series was detrended and 
deseasonalized, observations would still fluctuate randomly about some mean level” 
(McDowall, et al., p i4). For this analysis, a time variable (T) was included to account for 
the trend component in this time series.
Pooled Time Series Analysis
For the pooled time series analysis, the impact of the type of merit aid program 
(full, partial, or one-time payment) across states with similar programs was examined. 
There were three intervention related dummy variables that were created for this study. 
The first is a time trend (T), which accounts for the increasing trend in enrollment over 
time, regardless of the policy adoption. The second is an intervention variable (TT) 
which examines the immediate impact of the policy adoption. A significant TT indicates 
that there was an immediate significant impact of the policy on enrollment. The third is a 
longitudinal trend counter (TTT) which examines the long term impact of the policy 
adoption. A significant TTT indicates that there was a significant long term impact of the 
policy adoption on enrollment.
A dummy variable for each of the states by program types (1= Yes, 0=No for 
each. One time payment. Partial tuition payment. Full tuition payment) was created.
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Once the states have been assigned a code based on their merit aid program type, the data 
were aggregated into the three large program categories. Then the data across each 
condition separately were analyzed. The use of a dummy variable is recommended by 
the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) model, as suggested by Sayrs (1989) for 
studies with non-constant variation which is unique to each cross-section within the time 
series. There are legitimate concerns regarding the aggregation of data over units of 
analysis that are not comparable. However, the “pooled design will quickly reveal 
noncomparability because the disturbance vector will not fit a set of realistic assumptions 
about the data” (Sayrs, p. 16).
In his similar study of health reform policies across states. Stream (1999) used a 
pooled cross-sectional time series data set that was constructed to examine factors related 
to health reform across fifty states for a period of time to create a “state-year” variable.
In this study, a similar pooled variable was created for the enrollment in each state for a 
given year, which served as the unit of analysis for research question 2 , the state level 
pooled time series analyses. A second pooled variable was created for the enrollment in 
each sector in each state for a given year, which served as the unit of analysis for research 
question 4, the sector level pooled time series analysis.
Levels of Analysis
The analysis in this study took place in two main stages, according to the research 
questions. For the purposes of the dissertation, and in order to provide the reader with 
clarity as to how the research questions relate to specific data sets and methodologies, the
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reader is referred to Appendix A, which outlines the datasets and methodologies in a 
matrix for ease of use.
State Level Analysis
1. How has merit aid impacted postsecondary participation in each of the states that 
has adopted this student financial aid policy?
2. What is the effect of the following three types of merit aid programs on state-level 
participation:
a) Full-tuition programs
b) Partial tuition programs
c) One time payment programs
Sector Level Analvsis
3. How much has merit aid impacted participation by sector and level in the states 
that have adopted this financial aid policy?
4. What is the effect of the following three types of merit aid programs on 
enrollment across similar programs by sector and level?
a. Full tuition
i. 2 -year public
ii. 2 -year private
iii. 4-year public
iv. 4-year private
b. Partial tuition
i. 2 -year public
ii. 2 -year private
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iii. 4-year public
iv. 4-year private
c. One time payment
i. 2 -year public
ii. 2 -year private
iii. 4-year public
iv. 4-year private
Hypotheses
Hypotheses were written for the research questions to allow for a test of 
significant differences to a) compare participation before and after policy enactment of 
merit policies, and b) compare participation differences across the three different types of 
merit aid programs. The hypotheses for each of the questions are as follows:
1. How has merit aid impacted first time undergraduate postsecondary participation 
in each of the states that has adopted this student financial aid policy?
• For each state,
i. Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect 
on enrollment in the state.
ii. Ha: by -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on 
enrollment in the state.
• bb is the slope of the line before policy adoption, which was calculated using 
regression analysis for the time series for each state separately
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• ba is the slope of the line after the policy adoption, which was be calculated 
using regression analysis for the line in the time series after the policy 
adoption for each state.
2. What is the effect of the following three types of merit aid programs on 
enrollment across similar programs:
• Using pooled data for Full tuition programs
i. Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect 
on enrollment in the state.
ii. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on 
enrollment in the state.
• Using pooled data for Partial tuition programs
i. Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect 
on enrollment in the state.
ii. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on 
enrollment in the state.
• Using pooled data for One time payment programs
i. Ho: bb -  ba= 0 , the policy adoption did not have a significant effect 
on enrollment in the state.
ii. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on 
enrollment in the state.
• bb is the slope of the line before policy adoption for the pooled state level data 
which were calculated by aggregating the institutional data for each state and 
then compiling the states’ data into program types. For the full tuition
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programs, N=6, for the Partial tuition programs, N=6 and for the One time 
payment programs, N=1.
• ba is the slope of the line after the policy adoption for the pooled state level 
data calculated by aggregating the institutional data for each state and then 
compiling the states’ data into program types.
3. How has merit aid impacted participation by sector and level in the states that 
have adopted this financial aid policy?
• Using pooled data for each state,
i. 2 -year public
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment in the state.
2. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment in the state.
ii. 2 -year private
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment in the state.
2. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment in the state.
iii. 4-year public
1. Ho; bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment in the state.
2. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment in the state.
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iv. 4-year private
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment in the state.
2. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment in the state.
• bb is the slope of the line before policy adoption for the pooled 
institutional level data which is calculated by aggregating the institutional 
data for each sector and level.
• ba is the slope of the line after the policy adoption for the pooled 
institutional level data calculated by aggregating the institutional data for 
each state by sector and level.
4. What is the effect of the following three types of merit aid programs on 
enrollment across similar programs by sector and level?
• Full tuition
i. 2 -year public
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment.
2. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment.
ii. 2 -year private
1. Ho: bb - b a =  0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment.
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2. Ha: by ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment.
iii. 4-year public
1. Ho: bb -ba= 0 , the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment.
2. Ha: bb -ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment.
iv. 4-year private
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0 , the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment.
2. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment.
• Partial tuition
i. 2 -year public
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0 , the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment.
2. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment.
ii. 2 -year private
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment.
2. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment.
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iii. 4-year public
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment.
2. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment.
iv. 4-year private
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0 , the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment.
2. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0 
• One time payment
i. 2 -year public
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment
2. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment
ii. 2 -year private
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0 the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment.
2. Ha: b b - b a ^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment.
iii. 4-year public
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment.
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2. Ha; b y - b a #  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment
iv. 4-year private
1. Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a 
significant effect on enrollment.
2. Ha: bb -  ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant 
effect on enrollment.
•  where bb is the slope of the line before policy adoption and ba is the slope 
of the line after the policy adoption.
Description of Analyses 
In the first part of this study, which addresses research questions 1 and 2, this 
research examines the impact of merit aid policies on enrollment of postsecondary 
students on a broad state level. The second part of this study, research questions 3 and 4, 
utilize institutional level data, to facilitate analyses of the data by sector (private/public) 
and level (2 and 4-year). The analysis examined comparisons within sectors and levels 
for the same states, but it also examined comparisons by sector and level across states 
with similar aid programs to see if similarities in enrollment changes occurred before and 
after policy adoptions.
First, a pooled time series analysis of enrollment for each of the merit aid states 
was separately conducted. Meyer (1995) argues that, “government policies often create 
natural treatment and comparison groups. Frequently, this event occurs because our 
federal system of government allows one state to change a policy while others do not.
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The many cross-state differences in policies and changes in these policies allow the 
examination of a wide range of questions” (p. 158)
Merit aid policies provide a unique opportunity for higher education scholars to 
examine the impact of state level financial aid on participation at the state and 
institutional levels. Specifically, there are three main types of merit aid that these 
policies provide for examination: 1) One time payment, as in the case of Michigan; 2) 
Partial payment, as in the case of Missouri, Mississippi, and 3) Full tuition payment, as in 
the case o f Georgia and Florida. For the second phase of analyses, the data were 
aggregated across states with similar aid types in order to examine the differential effects 
of each type of merit aid program.
The third step in this analysis examined how much merit aid impacted 
participation by sector and level in the states that have adopted this financial aid policy. 
This was done using time series analysis with institutional data that is aggregated by 
sector (private and public) and level (2-year and 4-year) within each state.
The fourth analysis was a time series analysis to determine the impact on 
enrollment by type of aid program in each sector and level across states with similar aid 
programs. As described earlier, this by compiling the institutional data for each of the 
states with similar aid types, plotting this data against time for each program type by 
sector and level, and then calculating a regression line for each sector.
Prior research suggests that students will go to the higher cost institution when 
their choice is on the margins (Dynarski, 2003). However, the magnitude of the impact 
has yet to be determined as well as if that impact is uniform across all types of merit aid 
programs. The analysis in this study provides regression equations that fit the data for the
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observed trends in each of the states, merit aid program types, within sectors across states 
or sectors within a single state.
Impact Analysis
According to McDowall, et. al. (1980), in time series impact analysis, there are 
four main trends that emerge from the graphs (See Figure 2, below). The first pattern that 
may emerge is the gradual and permanent change in the trend. For this study, the change 
would be indicated by gradual change in enrollment after the adoption of a merit aid 
policy; that is, the slope and the intercept of the line changes gradually over time. The 
second is a gradual and temporary impact, which is indicated by a slow rise in the data 
line then a decline back to the pre-intervention state. The intercept changes and slope 
both change and then return back to their original state. The third impact is an abrupt 
initial impact and a permanent long term change, as indicated by a change in both the 
slope of the line as well as the intercept that remains over time. The fourth and final 
impact is an abrupt initial impact with a gradual return to the initial state.
If legislators are looking to merit aid to make a significant long-term impact on 
enrollment, they are likely going to want to see a permanent impact and most would 
probably prefer an abrupt change as well. The slope of the line is significant because it 
indicates the rate of participation in this study. As outlined earlier, Martinez (2004) 
determined the participation gaps across the states. The four o f  the five states with the 
most significant gaps in participation are merit aid states. If merit aid proves to be a 
useful tool in closing this gap, it could prove to be a successful strategy for other states
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with significant participation gaps to utilize in an effort to raise the level of postsecondary 
participation in their states.
Figure 2. Impact Patterns
D u ra tion
Permanent Temporary
I
S
<
Source: McDowall, et. al. (1980)
Modeling Using Regression Analysis 
The initial equations for the time series analysis were estimated to determine the 
impact of the award on enrollments in each of the merit aid states. The initial equation 
estimated for enrollment in each state (at both the state and sector/level of analysis) is:
Yt= bo + b]T + b2TT + bsTTT + b4XHS0RAD + b$XHEAPP+ bbXiNsxTuix + b̂ XuNEMP + St
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where Yt = number of time-series observations for enrollment. T= a time counter from 1 
to N, where N is the number of years observed for each state; so some states will have 7 
years while others have 12, depending on how long ago the policy was adopted. TT = a 
dummy variable coded 0 for those years before the adoption of merit aid policy and 1 for 
the years after. This dummy variable is an indicator of when the state adopted the policy. 
TTT = a dummy variable coded 0 for the years before adoption and 1 ,2 ,3 , ...for years 
after the adoption of the policy and serves as a counter for the number of years in which 
the policy is in effect; and Ct= the error term (Bingham & Felbinger, 2002).
Additionally, HSGRAD = the number of public high school graduates in the state.
HEAPP = the higher education appropriations in the state. INSTTUIT = average in state 
tuition. UNEMP -  annual unemployment rate in the state. The independent control 
variables were selected based on previous work by Long (2003), where she investigated 
the impact of the HOPE merit aid policy adoption on these factors.
The assumptions for regression analysis apply to the use of regressions in time 
series analysis. The basic assumptions for regressions according to Lewis-Beck (1980) 
are: 1) No specification error, that is that the relationship between X, and Yi is linear and 
that no relevant independent variables have been excluded and no irrelevant independent 
variables have been included. 2) No measurement error, which is that the variables X; and 
Yi are accurately measured. 3) The following assumptions concern the error term, 8;: zero 
mean E (Si) = 0. For each observation, the expected value of the error term is zero. 
Homoscedasticity E(Si )̂ = 6 .̂ The variance of the error term is constant for all values of 
Xj. No autocorrelation: E(8,£j) = 0 (i ^ j). The error terms are uncorrelated. The
43
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
independent variable is uncorrelated with the error terms E (eiXi) = 0. Normality. The 
error term, e c , is normally distributed” (p. 26).
Data
Prior to analysis, the researcher applied for permission to conduct research using 
secondary data on human subjects by the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Office for the 
Protection of Research Subjects. Permission to conduct this research was granted on 
March 13, 2006. Exempt research review status was applied to this research because the 
National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS) was the source for the dependent variable, first time undergraduate 
student enrollment at an institutional level. The institutional participation for each of the 
15 states (Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Nevada, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, 
and West Virginia) was downloaded for each year.
This study focuses on the analysis of the 12 states with more than five years of 
data since the policy adoption. However, data from Tennessee, Washington, and West 
Virginia were used also collected to provide an early indication of their enrollment 
response. In the case where institutional data were missing, the institutional outliers were 
noted and removed from the data set (see Appendix E for the removed institutions). For 
state level participation, the IPEDS institutional data for each state were compiled in 
order to calculate the state level participation rates for each year. For the sector level 
participation, the IPEDS institutional data for each sector in each state were compiled in 
order to calculate the sector’s participation rates for each year. The data were limited by
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selecting to examine the only the first time undergraduate population since merit aid 
applies to undergraduate students and initial enrollment.
The independent variables in this study were tuition (INSTTUIT), state higher 
education appropriations (HEAPP), number of public high school graduates (HSGRAD), 
annual unemployment rate (UNEMP), and three dummy variables that were coded to 
determine the impact of the merit aid policies on enrollment. The first dummy variable 
(T) was a time counter (1,2,3,.. .n); the second dummy variable (TT) was an indicator for 
when the program began, program = 0 before adoption, 1 after adoption; the third dummy 
variable (TTT) was a trend indicator where trend = 0 before adoption and 1,2,3,.. .n after 
adoption. The in-state undergraduate tuition data were downloaded at the same time as 
the enrollment data from IPEDS for each year.
For research question R Q l, the pooled annual average in-state resident tuition was 
calculated, which included two and four year private and public institutions. The state 
higher education appropriations were downloaded from the Illinois State University’s 
Grapevine website for each year. The number of public high school graduates was 
retrieved from the Pell Institute and Tom Mortenson’s Postsecondary OPPORTUNITY 
website. The annual unemployment rate for each state was downloaded from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) website.
There are three states that have adopted merit aid policies in the last three years: 
Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia. The enrollment in these states served as a 
test for the regression equations developed out of the models for each of the merit aid 
programs. Additionally, South Carolina had two programs that were adopted within five 
years of each other; the latter was modeled after the Georgia HOPE and bears the same
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name. The data for South Carolina was examined with both merit aid programs included 
in the analysis. All of the states selected for this study have at least five years of data post 
adoption of the merit aid policy. Additionally, programs that only serve 4-6 students, as 
in the case of Wyoming, were excluded because of the limited impact on participation.
Summary
This chapter presented the four main research questions along with hypotheses. 
Two of the research questions concerned the impact of the policy adoption at a state level 
and two at the sector level. There were 12 states that were fully examined in this study. 
An additional three states. West Virginia, Washington, and Tennessee, are briefly 
examined for initial impact since their policies have been adopted in the last five years.
Then, outlined the methods of this study, which used pooled and time series 
regression models to examine the impaet of state merit aid scholarship programs on 
postsecondary enrollment. It also provided a detailed account of the impact analysis and 
subsequent analysis that took place in this study.
This chapter also presented a summary of all of the data that was used for this 
study and identified the sources for both the independent and dependent variables. 
Independent variables were selected from previous studies on merit aid and the dependent 
variable was selected based on eligibility from the initial phase of the adoption.
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CHAPTER 4
STATE LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Introduction
Chapters 4 and 5 present the results of the statistical analysis of the research 
questions of this study. Chapter 4 contains the results of the state level analyses in 
research question RQl and RQ2. Chapter 5 contains the results of the sector level 
analyses in research questions RQ3 and RQ4. The purpose of this study was to examine 
the differential impact of the comprehensive state-wide merit scholarship programs 
across states, sectors and institutions. Both chapters 4 and 5, which present the results of 
this study, are organized by research question. The first two research questions are 
concerned with the impact of merit aid policies on a state level and are contained in 
chapter 4. Research question one (RQl), how has merit aid impacted non-profit 
postsecondary participation in each of the states that has adopted this student financial aid 
policy? Research question two (RQ2), what is the effect of the following three types of 
merit aid programs on state-level participation: Full-tuition programs; Partial tuition 
programs; and One time payment programs.
For research question RQl, analyses of the determinants of state level enrollment 
were conducted in each state using time series regression. Institutional enrollment data 
was compiled for each year and used as the state level enrollment figure in the analysis. 
Research question RQ2 was an analysis of the determinants of enrollment across states
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with similar merit aid types using pooled time series analysis. This analysis was 
conducted in three stages. First, enrollment data of states with full tuition programs was 
pooled and analyzed, then states with partial tuition payment programs, and then the one 
state with one time payment program was analyzed using backward multiple regression 
analysis.
For all of the backward stepwise time series regression models, variables in the 
model that produced the smallest change in the r̂  and where the ‘probability of F-to- 
remove >.10’ no longer held were removed. The significant time series graphs and 
backward multiple regression analysis results are presented in this chapter. The graphs in 
this chapter are the time series for each state. The tables in this chapter include (a) the 
multiple correlation coefficients, R, (b) the coefficient of determination r squared or r ,̂
(c) adjusted r ,̂ (d) unstandardized coefficients B with standard error (Std.error), (e) 
standardized coefficients Beta, t-statistic, and (f) significance (Sig.). Summaries of all of 
the regression outputs for research question RQl can be found in Appendix B.
Finally, autocorrelation is a concern with time series analysis and therefore the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is calculated in this study as a test of autocorrelation. Only those 
Durbin-Watson statistics that were of concern because they were outside of the upper or 
lower limits of the statistic (given the degrees of freedom and number of cases) and 
demonstrated the existence of autocorrelation in the data are presented in this chapter. A 
complete table o f  the Durbin-Watson statistic outputs can be found in Appendix E. The 
analysis was performed using SPSS 13.0 for Windows.
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Research Question 1 
Research question 1 : How has merit aid impacted first time undergraduate 
postsecondary participation in each of the states that has adopted this student financial aid 
policy?
For research question 1, each state is presented with the hypotheses, then a graph 
of the data, then the entry and final regression equations, then a table of the analysis with 
a summary description. For each state, the N = years of observations. For example, in 
Alaska, there were ten years of pooled enrollment data so N=10.
Alaska (AK)
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption was equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Ha: bb -  ba 9  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the state 
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL = HEAPP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT + UNEMP 
Final model: ENROLL = HSGRAD + TT + TTT +UNEMP + CONSTANT 
Below is the graph of the time series for enrollment in Alaska, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption.
Figure 3. Annual Enrollment Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, Alaska
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The significance of F(4, 9) = 78.759, p<.001 is well below the a< .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. More than 97 percent (adjusted = .972) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by the number of high school graduates in the state, the short and 
long term impact of the policy adoption and unemployment. Approximately 2 percent of 
the variance is due to other factors other than those initial factors stepped out as not 
significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive 
power of unemployment, policy adoption, long term impact, and the number of high
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school graduates. Since the short term impact (TT) and long term impact (TTT) is 
significant, the Ho is rejected.
Table 1
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model for Alaska® (N=10)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 1421.056 860.275 1.652 .159
HSGRAD .408 .102 .632 4.004 .010
TTT 169.223 34.581 .932 4.894 .004
TT -476.621 95.716 -.728 -4.980 .004
UNEMP -277.457 51.799 -.507 -5.356 .003
Note: R= .992, R Square = .984, Adjusted R Square = .972.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Arkansas (AR)
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
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Ha: bb -  ba ^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Below is the graph of the time series for enrollment in Arkansas, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption.
Figure 4. Annual Emollment Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, Arkansas
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The entry and final regression m odels are:
Entry model: ENROLL=HEAPP + UNEMP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT 
Final model: ENROLL = UNEMP + TTT + T + CONSTANT
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The significance of F(3, 18) =16.786, p<.001 is well below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 73 percent (adjusted = .725) of the variation in
enrollment is explained by unemployment, time, and the long term impact of the policy 
adoption. Approximately 20 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than 
those initial factors stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients 
(beta) estimates relative predictive power of higher education appropriations, time, the 
long term impact of the policy adoption, and unemployment. Reject Ho since the long 
term (TTT) impact of the policy was significant.
Table 2
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model for Arkansas" (N=19)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 7316.377 1802.698 4.059 .001
UNEMP 877.156 188.636 1.138 4.650 .000
T 1105.536 162.658 6.195 6.797 .000
TTT -1019.994 163.838 -4.991 -6.226 .000
Note; R= .878, R Square = .770, Adjusted R Square = .725.
" Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
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Florida (FL)
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Ha: bb -  ba ^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + UNEMP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT 
Final model: ENROLL = HEAPP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT + 
CONSTANT
The significance of F(6, 12) = 122.291, p<.001 is well below the a<  .05. Table 3 
provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard error for 
the final model. More than 98 percent (adjusted R  ̂= . 984) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by the number of high school graduates, time, the adoption of the 
merit aid policy and its long term impact, in state tuition, and higher education 
appropriations. Approximately one percent of the variance is due to other factors other 
than those initial factors stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of higher education appropriations, 
the number o f high school graduates, time, the short and long term impaet of the policy
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adoption, and in state tuition. Reject Hq since the long (TTT) and short (TT) term impact 
of the policy adoption was significant.
Below is the graph of the time series for enrollment in Florida, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption.
Figure 5. Annual Enrollment Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, Florida
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Table 3
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Florida^ (N=13)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 392939.30 55295.696 7.106 .000
HEAPP -4.I2E-005 .000 -1.409 -5.058 .002
HSGRAD -1.855 .492 -1.579 -3.772 .009
TTT 19572.050 3138.997 3326 6.235 .001
TT 12585.582 3876.971 .367 3.246 .018
T 7898.025 1662.336 1.773 4.751 .003
INSTTUIT -24.349 4.665 -1.564 -5.220 .002
Note: R= .996, R Square = .992, Adjusted R Square = .984.
“ Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Georgia (GA)
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
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Ha: bb -  ba 0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Below is the graph of the time series for enrollment in Georgia, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption.
Figure 6. Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, Georgia
c«
E
2c
UJ 50000-
40000“
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + UNEMP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT 
Final model: ENROLL = UNEMP + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F(2,l 8) = 37.621, p<.001 is well below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard
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error for the final model. Nearly 83 percent (adjusted R = .803) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by unemployment and time. Approximately 17 percent of the 
variance is due to other factors other than those initial factors stepped out as not 
significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive 
power of the number of time (T) and unemployment (UNEMP). Accept Ho since there 
was no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption.
Table 4
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Georgia® (N=19)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 12573.466 9927.583 1.267 .223
T 1878.085 230.509 1.126 R148 .000
UNEMP 5088.554 1661.784 .423 3.062 .007
Note: R= .908, R Square = .825, Adjusted R Square =.803.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Kentuckv IKY)
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
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Ho: by -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Ha: by -  ba 7  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Below is the graph of the time series for enrollment in Kentucky, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption.
Figure 7. Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, Kentucky
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The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL- HEAPP + UNEMP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + T + TTT + CONSTANT
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The significance of F(5,10) = 10.530, p<.001 is well below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. More than 78 percent (adjusted -  .782) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by the long term impact of the policy adoption (TTT), time (T), 
and the average in state tuition (INSTTUIT). Approximately 22 percent of the variance 
is due to other factors other than those initial factors stepped out as not significant in this 
state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of time (T), the 
long term impact (TTT) of the policy adoption and in state tuition (INSTTUIT).
Table 5
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Kentucky^ (N-11)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 59559.338 6639.310 8.971 .000
TTT 2477.449 632.461 4.112 3.917 .006
T 1888.717 391.005 4.607 4.830 .002
INSTTUIT -9.592 2.160 -7.981 -4.440 .003
Note: R= .921, R Square = .848, Adjusted R Square = .782.
 ̂Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
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Louisiana (LA)
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the poliey 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations;
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: b b - h a ^  0, the poliey adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment
Figure 8 is a graph of the time series for enrollment in Louisiana, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption.
Figure 8. Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, Louisiana
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The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + UNEMP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT 
Final model: ENROLL = HSGRAD + T + TTT + CONSTANT
Table 6
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Louisiana® (N=12)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -30150.46 18288.012 -1.649 .138
HSGRAD 2.031 .554 1.246 3 /# 3 .006
TTT 1862.996 729.625 2.034 2.553 .034
T -1382.392 633J29 -2088 -2.183 .061
Note: R= .914, R Square = .835, Adjusted R Square = .740.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F(3, 11) = 10.576, p<.001 is well below the a<  .05. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Almost 74 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .740) of the 
variation in enrollment is explained by the number of public high school graduates in the 
state (HSGRAD), the long term impact (TTT) of the policy adoption, and time (T). 
Approximately 26 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than those initial 
factors stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta)
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estimates relative predictive power of the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD),
time (T), and the long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoption.
Michigan (MI)
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: b b - h a ^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
Since Michigan had only 10 cases and there were 7 independent variables that 
were in the entry model, the Durbin-Watson statistic showed that there was negative 
autocorrelation (DW= 3.577). In order to correct for this serial correlation, the researcher 
reduced the number of independent variables to include only those that would examine 
the impact of the policy adoption, time (T), program (TT), and long term impact (TTT). 
This reduction of the number of independent variables brought the Durbin-Watson 
statistic to within the acceptable range (DW=2.67). The entry and final regression 
models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT
Final model: ENROLL = T + TT + TTT + CONSTANT
Figure 9 is the graph of the time series for enrollment in Michigan, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption.
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Figure 9: Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, Michigan
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The significance of F(3,9) = 32.194, p<.001 is well below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. More than 91 percent (adjusted = .912) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by the short (TT) and long (TTT) term impact of the policy 
adoption and time. Approximately 9 percent of the variance is due to other factors other 
than those initial factors stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of time and the short and long term 
impact of the policy adoption. Reject Ho since there was a significant long (TTT) and 
short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
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Table 7.
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Michigan® (N=10)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 72783.800 1560.781 46.633 .000
TT 4554.400 1940.305 .478 2.347 .057
T 1673.000 470.593 1.008 3.555 .012
TTT -1426.400 665.519 -.543 -2.158 .074
Note: R= .970, R Square = .942, Adjusted R Square -  .912.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Missouri (MCI
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Ha: b b - b a ^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Below is the graph of the time series for enrollment in Missouri, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption.
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Figure 10. Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, Missouri
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The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + UNEMP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT
Final model: ENROLL = TTT + CONSTANT
The significance of F(l,12) = 166.096, p<.001 is well below the a<  .05. The
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and
standard error for the final model. More than 93 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .932) of the
variation in enrollment is explained by the long term impact of the policy adoption.
Approximately 7 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than those initial
factors stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta)
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estimates relative predictive power of the long term impact (TTT) of the policy adoption.
Reject Ho since there was a long term impact of the policy adoption.
Table 8
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Missouri^ (N=13)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant)
TTT
38076.549 314.415 
1022.913 79.371 468
121.103
12.888
.000
.000
Note: R= .968, R Square = .938, Adjusted R Square = .932.
“ Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Mississippi (MS)
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Ha: b y - b a ^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
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Below is the graph of the time series for enrollment in Mississippi, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption.
Figure 11. Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, Mississippi
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The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL- HEAPP + UNEMP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT
Final model: ENROLL = UNEMP + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F(2,13) = 32.069, p<.001 is well below the a<  .05. The figure
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard
error for the final model. Nearly 83 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .827) of the variation in
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enrollment is explained by time and unemployment. Approximately 17 percent o f the 
variance is due to other factors other than those initial factors stepped out as not 
significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive 
power of time (T) and unemployment (UNEMP). Accept Ho, there was neither a long 
(TTT) nor a short (TT) term impact on enrollment after the policy adoption.
Table 9
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Mississippi® (N=14)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 13750.600 3840.165 3.581 .004
T 904.071 120.195 1.134 7.522 .000
UNEMP 1339.683 489.083 .413 2.739 .019
Note: R= .924, R Square = .854, Adjusted R Square = .827.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
New Mexico (NM)
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
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Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Ha: b y - b a ^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Below is the graph of the time series for enrollment in New Mexico, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption.
Figure 12. Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, New Mexico
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The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + UNEMP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT
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Final model: ENROLL = TTT + CONSTANT
The significance of F(l,12) = 21.922, p<.001 is well below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 64 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .635) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by the long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoption. 
Approximately 36 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than those initial 
factors stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) 
estimates relative predictive power of the long term impact of the poliey adoption. Reject 
Ho since there was a significant long term (TTT) effect of the policy adoption on 
enrollment.
Table 10
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for New Mexico® (N=13)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant)
TTT
13610.248 206.906 
244.549 52.231 .816
65.780
4.682
.000
.001
Note: R= .816, R Square = .666, Adjusted R Square = .635.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
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Nevada (NV)
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Ha: b b - b a #  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + UNEMP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT 
Final model: ENROLL = UNEMP + HEAPP + TT + INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
The significance of F(4,9) = 18.063, p<.004 is well below the a<  .05. The figure 
above provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 94 percent (R^ = .935) of the variation in enrollment is 
explained by the unemployment rate in the state (UNEMP), higher education 
appropriations (HEAPP), the adoption of the policy (TT), and the average in state tuition 
(INSTTUIT). Approximately 6 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than 
those initial factors stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients 
(beta) estimates relative predictive power of the number of unemployment rates 
(UNEMP), higher education appropriations (HEAPP), the policy adoption (TT), and 
instate tuition (INSTTUIT). Reject Ho since there is a significant short term impact (TT) 
of the policy adoption.
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Figure 13 is the graph of the time series for enrollment in Nevada, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption.
Figure 13: Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, Nevada
14000-
C0)
E
10000“
2c
U J
8000 -
6000 -
1999 20011995 1997 2003
Year
73
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 11
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Nevada** (N=10)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 4645.729 2720.136 1.708 .148
HEAPP -1.36E-005 .000 -.846 -2.195 .080
TT -3295.486 912.725 -1.149 -3.611 .015
INSTTUIT 2.602 .582 2.550 4.475 .007
UNEMP -1696.064 365.433 -.597 -4.641 .006
Note: R= .967, R Square = .935, Adjusted R Square = .883.
“ Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
South Carolina (SC)
Since South Carolina had two policies that were adopted, there are two analyses 
for this state. The first analysis is of the first policy adoption in 1998 and the second 
examines the impact of the second policy adoption in 2001. These hypotheses are 
represented by the equations:
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Ha: b y - b a ^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
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Figure 14 is the graph of the time series for enrollment in South Carolina, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the first policy adoption.
Figure 14. Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, South 
Carolina
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The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + UNEMP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT
Final model: ENROLL = UNEMP + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F(2,l 1) = 69.580, p<.001 is well below the a<  .05. The figure
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard
error for the final model. Nearly 93 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .926) of the variation in
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enrollment is explained by time (T) and unemployment (UNEMP). Approximately 7 
percent of the variance is due to other factors other than those initial factors stepped out 
as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative 
predictive power of time (T) and unemployment (UNEMP). Accept Ho since there was 
not a significant short (TT) or long (TTT) term impact of the policy adoption on 
enrollment.
Table 12
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for South Carolina^ (N=12)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 24137.218 1254.332 19.243 .000
T 816.957 73.633 .912 11.095 .000
UNEMP 772.613 214.761 .296 3.598 .006
Note: R= .969, R Square = .939, Adjusted R Square = .926.
“ Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + UNEMP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT 
Final model: ENROLL = HSGRAD + T + TTT + CONSTANT
The significance of F(3,l 1) = 95.834, p<.001 is well below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard
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error for the final model. More than 96 percent (R^ = .963) of the variation in enrollment 
is explained by the number of public high school graduates in the state, the impact of the 
policy adoption, and time. Almost 4 percent of the variance is due to other factors other 
than those initial factors stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the number of high school 
graduates (HSGRAD), time (T), and the immediate impact (TT) of the policy adoption. 
The second policy adoption had a significant positive impact on enrollment, reject Ho. 
Overall, enrollment was also significantly increasing as time went on.
Figure 15 is a graph for the second merit aid policy adoption in South Carolina,
Figure 15 Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, South Carolina
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Table 13
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Soutb Carolina® (N=12)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 14612.997 7821.373 1.868 .099
HSGRAD .501 .259 .133 1.931 .090
TT 41.63.359 696.487 .635 5.978 .000
T 305.054 104.642 .341 2.915 .019
Note: R= .986, R Square = .973, Adjusted R Square = .963.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  -  .05
Tennessee tTNl
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Ha: b b - b a ^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Figure 16 is the graph of the time series for enrollment in Tennessee, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption. One year of data post-policy
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intervention are not a sufficient number of observations to run a time series regression; 
however the graph of the data are provided to give the reader a general impression of the 
impact of the policy on enrollment.
Figure 16. Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, Tennessee
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Washington (WAl
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
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Ha: b b - b a ^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Figure 17 is the graph of the time series for enrollment in Washington with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption. Two years of data post­
policy intervention are not a sufficient number of observations to run a time series 
regression; however, the graph of the data are provided to give the reader a general 
impression of the impact of the policy on enrollment.
Figure 17: Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, Washington
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West Virginia (WV)
The first hypothesis states that the slope of the regression line before the policy 
adoption is equal to the slope of the line after the intervention in each state. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the slopes are not equal. These hypotheses are represented 
by the equations:
Ho: bb -  ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Ha: h b - h a ^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment in the 
state.
Figure 18. Annual Enrollment by Year Pre- and Post- Merit Aid Adoption, West Virginia
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Figure 18 is the graph of the time series for enrollment in West Virginia, with an 
intervention line indicating the year of the policy adoption. Two years of data post­
policy intervention are not an acceptable number of observations to run a time series 
regression; however the graph of the data are provided to give the reader a general 
impression of the impact of the policy on enrollment.
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2: What is the effect of the following three types of merit aid 
programs on first time undergraduate enrollment across states (a) full tuition payment 
programs, (b) partial tuition payment programs, (c) one time payment programs?
This analysis was conducted in three stages, first the data for all of the full tuition 
payment scholarship states was compiled and analyzed, then the states with partial tuition 
payment programs, and then the one state with a one time payment program was 
analyzed. States with full tuition payment programs include; AK, FL, GA, LA, NM, and 
WV. States with partial tuition payment programs include: AR, KY, MS, MO, NV, and 
SC. Since TN, WA and WV adopted the policy less than five years ago; there are an 
insufficient number of years available so they are not included in the analysis. The one 
time payment state is MI. For this research question, the data for each year for the states 
is pooled by merit aid payment program. For example, there are five states with full 
tuition programs that have been in place for more than five years and have varying 
numbers of years of data, depending on when the program started in that state. X 
number of years of data in each state.
82
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Full Tuition Merit Aid Programs 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba 7  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL- T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = T + HEAPP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
Table 14
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Full Tuition^ (N=67)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 1614.554 1930.174 .836 .406
HSGRAD .796 .062 jT 8 12.877 .000
HEAPP 8.87E-006 .000 .211 2.965 .004
INSTTUIT -2.033 .563 -.081 -3.613 .Oil
T 385.271 173.682 .052 2.218 .030
Note: R= .991, R Square = .982, Adjusted R Square = .981.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F(4,66) = 835.273, p<.001 is below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. More than 98 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .981) of the variation in
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enrollment is explained by the time, unemployment in the states, in state tuition, and the 
number of high school graduates in each state. Only 2 percent of the variance is due to 
other factors other than the program intervention, which was stepped out as not 
significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive 
power of higher education appropriations (HEAPP), the number of high school graduates 
(HSGRAD), time (T), all of which had a positive impact on enrollment. The in state 
tuition (INSTTUIT) had a negative impact on enrollment in the full tuition states. Accept 
Ho since there was no significant long (TTT) or short term (TT) impact of the policy 
adoption on enrollment.
Partial Tuition Merit Aid Programs 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb - ha ^ 0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = HEAPP + HSGRAD + TTT + UNEMP + CONSTANT
The significance of F (4, 78) = 117.280, p<.OOI is below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Approximately 86 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .856) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD) in each 
state, and the long term (TTT) impact of the merit aid program adoption, the higher 
education appropriations (HEAPP), and unemployment (UNEMP). Nearly 14 percent of 
the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the entry model 
which were stepped out as not significant in these states. The standard coefficients (beta)
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estimates relative predictive power of the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD), 
the long term impact of the policy intervention (TTT), unemployment (UNEMP) and the 
higher education appropriations (HEAPP), all of which had a positive impact on 
enrollment. Reject Ho since there was a significant negative long term impact of the 
policy adoption.
Table 15
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Partial Tuition States^ (N=79)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -14539.6 3205.163 -4.536 .000
HEAPP 2.47E-005 .000 .553 9.013 .000
HSGRAD .507 .052 .550 9.769 .000
TTT -348.448 135.170 -.118 -2.578 .012
UNEMP 1972.274 419.142 .219 4.706 .000
Note: R= .929, R Square = .864, Adjusted R Square = .856.
“ Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
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One Time Payment Merit Aid Programs 
Since Michigan was the only state with a One time payment program, it had only 
10 years of data and there were seven independent variables in the entry model, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic showed that there was negative autocorrelation (DW= 3.577). In 
order to correct for this serial correlation, the researcher reduced the number of 
independent variables to include only those that would examine the impact of the policy 
adoption, time (T), program (TT), and long term impact (TTT). This reduction of the 
number of independent variables brought the Durbin-Watson statistic to within the 
acceptable range (DW=2.67).
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT
Final model: ENROLL = T + TT + TTT + CONSTANT
The significance of F(3,9) = 32.194, p<.001 is well below the a< .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 91 percent (R^ = .912) of the variation in enrollment is 
explained by time (T), and the short (TT) and long (TTT) term impact of the policy 
adoption. Approximately 9 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than those 
initial factors stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) 
estimates relative predictive power of time, and the short and long term impact of the 
policy adoption. Accept Ho since there was not a significant long (TTT) or short term 
(TT) impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
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Table 16
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for One time Payment State ® (N=10)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 72783.800 1560.781 46.633 .000
TT 4554.400 1940.305 478 2.347 .057
T 1673.000 470.593 1.008 3.555 .012
TTT -1426.400 665.519 -.543 -2.158 .074
Note: R= .970, R Square = .942, Adjusted R Square = .912.
 ̂Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Summary
Chapter 4 presented the results of the time series graphs and the time series 
regression analysis of the data. In all, the longitudinal data for fifteen states were 
graphed to determine the onset and duration of the impact the policy adoption had. The 
analysis consisted of a backward multiple linear regressions to identify the predictive 
value and relationship between the merit aid policy adoption and first time undergraduate 
enrollment in the 15 states that have adopted these policies and across the three types of 
merit aid programs.
Based on Long’s (2003) work on the impact of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship on 
institutions and tuition, three variables were identified as having significant impact: state 
higher education appropriations, unemployment, and average tuition for in-state students.
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Because the number of high school graduates in a state is directly linked to the number of 
potential candidates for undergraduates, this study also accounts for the number of public 
high school graduates in each state.
In the analysis of the impact the adoption of the merit aid policies in each state, 
there was a significant positive short term impact on enrollment in Alaska, Florida, and 
Nevada. In states with less than five years of data to analyze, there was a significant 
short term impact on enrollment in West Virginia. There was a significant long term 
impact of the policy adoption in eight of the 15 states that adopted these policies, Alaska, 
Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, and Termessee. For a 
summary of these results, see Appendix D.
In addressing research question 2, across the five states with full tuition payment 
programs (AK, FL, G A, LA, and NM,), there was no significant long or short term 
impact of the policy adoption on enrollment. Across the six states with partial tuition 
payment programs (AR, KY, MS, MO, NV, SC), there was a statistically significant 
negative impact of policy adoption and enrollment, as demonstrated in Figure 35. In the 
state with a one-time payment program, there was no statistically significant impact of 
the policy adoption on first time undergraduate enrollment.
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CHAPTER 5
SECTOR LEVEL ANALYSES RESULTS 
Introduction
The third and fourth research questions are concerned with the impact of merit aid 
policies on the public 2 year, public 4 year, private 2 year and private 4 year institutions 
in each of the states and across the three broad merit aid program types (full tuition, 
partial tuition, and one time payment) and are presented in chapter 5. Research question 
three (RQ3), how much has merit aid impacted participation by sector and level in the 
states that have adopted this financial aid policy? And Research question four (RQ4), 
what is the effect of the following three types of merit aid programs on enrollment across 
similar programs by sector and level: full tuition; partial tuition; and one time payment?
An analysis of the determinants of sector and level enrollment (two year public, 
four year public, two year private and four year private) was conducted for each state 
using time series backward regression for research question RQ3. Finally, the analysis 
for research question RQ4 consisted of a time series regression of the determinants of 
sector and level enrollment across states with similar merit aid programs.
For all of the backward stepwise time series regression models, variables in the 
model that produced the smallest change in the r  ̂and where the ‘probability of F-to- 
remove >.10’ no longer held were removed. The significant time series graphs and 
backward multiple regression analysis results are presented in this chapter. The graphs in
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this chapter are the time series for each state. The tables in this chapter include (a) the 
multiple correlation coefficients, R, (b) the coefficient of determination r squared or r ,̂
(e) adjusted r ,̂ (d) unstandardized coefficients B with standard error (Std.error), (e) 
standardized coefficients Beta, t-statistie, and (f) significance (Sig.). Summaries o f all of 
the regression outputs for research question RQ3 can be found in Appendix C.
Finally, autocorrelation is a concern with time series analysis and therefore the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is calculated in this study as a test of autocorrelation. Only those 
Durbin-Watson statistics that were of concern because they were outside of the upper or 
lower limits of the statistic (given the degrees of freedom and number of cases) and 
demonstrated the existence of autocorrelation in the data are presented in this chapter. 
The analysis was performed using SPSS 13.0 for Windows.
Research Question 3
Research Question 3: How has merit aid impacted participation by sector and level in the 
states that have adopted this financial aid policy?
For the analysis of the data in this research question, the N = a data point for each 
institution in that sector for each year (five years before adoption and every year 
thereafter) in that state. For each states’ sectors, N=X(years * institutions) For example, 
in Alaska’s 2-year public sector, there was only one institution that reported data for the 
required amount of time; so, N=years (10) * institutions (1) =10, which means that there 
were ten years worth of data for one institution in that state.
Since this research question pertains to the sector and level of each state, the 
results are presented by state and then separated into sector and level (i.e. 2 year public, 4
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year public, 2 year private, 4 year private). States that did not have any private 2 year 
institutions do not have that section reported here.
Alaska. 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = T + TT + TTT + CONSTANT
Table 17
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Alaska, 2 year public “ (N=10)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -3.90 2.718 -1.435 .201
T 3.900 .820 1.212 4.759 .003
TT 10.800 3J79 .584 3.196 .019
TTT -4.700 1.159 -.916 -4.055 .007
Note: R= .976, R Square = .953, Adjusted R Square = .929.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (3, 9) = 40.427, p<.001 is below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard
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error for the final model. Nearly 93 percent (adjusted = .929) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained hy the short (TT) and long (TTT) term impact of the policy 
adoption and time (T). Almost 7 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than 
the variables ineluded in the entry model whieh were stepped out as not significant in this 
state. The standard coeffieients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the number 
of time (T), and the short (TT) and long (TTT) term impact of the policy adoption. 
Enrollment at two year publie institutions immediately increased then over the long run, 
decreased as a result of the long term impaet of the policy adoption. Reject Ho since 
there was both a long (TTT) and short term (TT) impact on enrollment.
Alaska. 4-Year Puhlic and 2-Year Private 
Alaska, 4-year public and 2-year private seetor analysis yielded no significant 
models from the analyses.
Alaska. 4-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = T + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (3,19) = 3.583, p<.037 is below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 29 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .290) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), time (T) and the number of high 
school graduates (HSGRAD). Almost 71 pereent of the variance is due to other factors
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other than the variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not 
significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predietive 
power of in-state tuition, the number of high school graduates, and time. Accept Ho since 
there is no significant long (TTT) or short term impaet of the policy adoption on 
enrollment.
Table 18
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Alaska, 4 year private “ (N=20)
Unstandardized
Coeffieients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -277.820 165.538 -1.678 .113
HSGRAD .065 .029 1.892 2.228 .041
T -9.688 5.298 -1.592 -1.829 .086
INSTTUIT -.006 .003 -.466 -2.078 .054
Note: R= .634, R Square = .402, Adjusted R Square = .290.
 ̂Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Arkansas. 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT
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Final model: ENROLL = T + INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2,194) = 15.207, p<.001 is below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 13 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .128) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time (T). Almost 87 percent 
of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the entry model 
which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) 
estimates relative predictive power of in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time (T). The 
policy adoption and time had a negative impact on enrollment in the two year public 
schools in Arkansas. Accept Ho since there is no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) 
term impact of the policy adoption.
Table 19
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Arkansas, 2 year publie “ (N=I95)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 730.655 888.299 .823 .412
T -62.888 18.765 -1.063 -3.351 .001
INSTTUIT .615 .112 .659 5.488 .000
Note: R= .370, R Square = .137, Adjusted R Square = .128.
“ Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
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Arkansas. 4-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a signifieant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = TTT + INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
Table 20
Regression Analysis Coeffieients, Final Model, for Arkansas, 4 year public “ (N=195)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 613.650 113.170 5.422 .000
TTT -40.641 14.770 -286 -2.752 .007
INSTTUIT .319 .071 .469 4.523 .000
Note: R= .324, R Square = .105, Adjusted R Square = .095.
“ Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  -  .05
The significance of F (2, 183) = 10.588, p<.001 is below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 10 percent (R  ̂= .095) of the variation in enrollment is 
explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and the long (TTT) term impact of the policy 
adoption. Almost 90 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the
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variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this 
state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of in-state 
tuition (INSTTUIT) and the long term (TTT) impaet of the policy adoption. The long 
term (TTT) policy adoption had a significant negative impact on enrollment in the four 
year publie schools in Arkansas, therefore, reject Ho.
Arkansas, 2-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = T + TTT + INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (3, 59) = 6.847, p<.OOI is below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 27 percent (R  ̂= .268) of the variation in enrollment is 
explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), the long term (TTT) impact of the policy 
adoption, and time (T). Almost 73 percent of the variance is due to other factors other 
than the variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant 
in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of in­
state tuition (INSTTUIT), the long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoption, and time 
(T). The long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoption was negative in the two year 
private schools in Arkansas. Reject Ho since there was a significant long (TTT) term 
impact of the policy adoption on enrolment.
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Table 21
Regression Analysis Coeffieients, Final Model, for Arkansas, 2-year private ® (N=60)
Unstandardized
Coeffieients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -35.482 27.775 -1.278 .207
T 19.308 6.611 2.093 2.921 .005
TTT -21.914 6.803 -2.236 -3.221 .002
INSTTUIT .008 .004 .332 2.310 .025
Note: R= .518, R Square = .268, Adjusted R Square = .229.
“ Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Arkansas, 4-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = T + TTT + HEAPP + INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (4, 206) = 9.293, p<.OOI is below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized eoeffieients, standardized eoefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 16 percent (R  ̂= .155) of the variation in enrollment is 
explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), higher education appropriations (HEAPP), the 
long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoption, and time (T). Almost 84 percent of the
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variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the entry model which 
were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) 
estimates relative predictive power of in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), higher education 
appropriations (HEAPP), the long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoption, and time 
(T). The long term impact (TTT) of the policy adoption was negative on the two year 
private schools in Arkansas. Reject the Ho since there was a significant long term (TTT) 
impact.
Table 22
Regression Analysis Coeffieients, Final Model, for Arkansas, 4 year private  ̂(N=206)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 107.814 42.065 2.563 .Oil
HEAPP -6.45E-008 .000 -.140 -2.071 .040
T 14.916 6.354 .356 2.347 .020
TTT -24.763 7.963 -.520 -3.no .002
INSTTUIT .030 .006 .450 5.115 .000
Note: R= .394, R Square = .155, Adjusted R Square = .139.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Florida. 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
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Ha: by-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = T + UNEMP + CONSTANT
Table 23
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Florida, 2 year public ® (N=496)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients '
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -25.790 556.401 -.046 .963
UNEMP 157.237 76.315 .126 2.060 .040
T 92.557 25.548 .221 3.623 .000
Note: R= .163, R Square = .027, Adjusted R Square = .023.
 ̂Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (2, 496) =6.731, p<.OOI is below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Only about 2 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .023) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by unemployment (UNEMP), and time (T). Nearly 98 percent of 
the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the entry model 
which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) 
estimates relative predictive power of unemployment (UNEMP), and time (T), both of
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which had a positive effect on enrollment. Accept Ho since there was no significant long 
(TTT) or short (TT) term impact on enrollment.
Florida. 4-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ha 9  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = TTT + CONSTANT
Table 24
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Florida, 4 year public® (N=I 15)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant)
TTT
2146.475 219.894 
250.677 55.033 .394
9.761
4.555
.000
.000
Note: R= .394, R Square = .155, Adjusted R Square = .148.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (I, 114) = 20.748, p<.001 is below the a<  .05. The figure 
below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 15 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .148) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by the long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoption. Almost 85
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percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
original entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power the long term (TTT) impaet of the 
policy adoption. Reject Ho since there was a significant long (TTT) term impact on 
enrollment.
Florida. 2-Year Private 
There were no signifieant models derived from the analysis for the 2-year private 
sector in Florida.
Florida. 4-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: h b-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = TTT + INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2,519) = 128.583, p<.000 is well below the a<  .05. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 33 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .330) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by in state tuition (INSTTUIT) and the long term (TTT) 
impact of the policy adoption. Almost 67 percent of the variance is due to other factors 
other than the variables included in the original entry model which were stepped out as 
not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive 
power of in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and the long term (TTT) impact of the policy 
adoption. An increase in the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) was associated with an
lOI
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increase in enrollment. However, the long term impaet of the policy adoption had a 
negative effect on enrollment in 4-year private institutions in the state. Reject Ho since 
there was a significant long term (TTT) impact on enrollment.
Table 25
Regression Analysis Coeffieients, Final Model, for Florida, 4 year private® (N=520)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coeffieients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -35.654 26.803 -1.330 .184
TTT -14.520 4.801 -.116 -3.024 .003
INSTTUIT .040 .003 .606 15.826 .000
Note: R= .576, R Square = .332, Adjusted R Square = .330.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL) a  = .05
Georgia. 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a signifieant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + UNEMP + CONSTANT
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Table 26
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Georgia, 2 year public® (N=668)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -1263.526 327.105 -3.863 .000
UNEMP 80.322 25.533 .123 3.146 .002
HSGRAD .018 .005 .145 3.709 .000
INSTTUIT .413 .068 .242 6.049 .000
Note: R= .300, R Square = .090, Adjusted R Square = .086.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (3,667) = 21.968, p<.000 is well below the a<  .05. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 8 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .086) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), unemployment (UNEMP), and 
the number o f high school graduates (HSGRAD). Almost 92 percent of the variance is 
due to other factors other than the variables included in the original entry model which 
were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) 
estimates relative predictive power of in state tuition (INSTTUIT), the number of high 
school graduates (HSGRAD), and unemployment (UNEMP). An increase in the average 
in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), unemployment (UNEMP), and the number of high school
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graduates (HSGRAD) were all associated with an increase in enrollment. Accept Ho 
since there was not a significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact on enrollment.
Georgia. 4-Year Public 
Ho; bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + T + CONSTANT
Table 27
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Georgia, 4-year public® (N=668)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -738.655 219.529 -3.365 .001
T -50.186 12.362 -.272 -4.060 .000
INSTTUIT 1.279 .146 ^#8 8.781 .000
Note: R= .454, R Square = .206, Adjusted R Square = .199.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (2,333) = 41.975, p<.000 is well below the a<  .05. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 20 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .197) of the variation
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in enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time (T). Almost 80 
percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
entry model which was stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of average in-state tuition 
(INSTTUIT) and time (T). An increase in the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) was 
associated with an increase in enrollment. However, the enrollment trend was decreasing 
over time in 4-year public institutions. Accept Ho since there was not a significant long 
(TTT) or short (TT) term impact on enrollment.
Georgia, 2-Year Private 
There was not a significant model that could be determined for the 2-year private sector 
in Georgia because the N was too small.
Georgia, 4-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = HEAPP + INSTTUIT + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F (3,402) = 28.931, p<.OOI is well below the a <  .05 
threshold. The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized 
coefficients, and standard error for the final model. Nearly 17 percent (adjusted R  ̂=
.172) of the variation in enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), higher 
education appropriations (HEAPP), and time (T). Almost 83 percent of the variance is 
due to other factors other than the variables included in the original entry model whieh
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were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coeffieients (beta) 
estimates relative predictive power of in state tuition (INSTTUIT), higher education 
appropriations (HEAPP), and time (T). Higher education appropriations (HEAPP) and 
the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) had a significant positive effect on 4 year private 
enrollment in Georgia. Accept Ho since there was not a significant long (TTT) or short 
(TT) term impact on enrollment.
Table 28
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Georgia, 4 year private® (N=176)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -113.899 I4I.48I -.805 .421
HEAPP 5.29E-007 .000 .504 2.326 .021
T -47.182 15.713 -.663 -3.003 .003
INSTTUIT .035 .004 488 8.882 .000
Note: R= .423, R Square = .179, Adjusted R Square = .172.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Kentuckv. 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment. 
Ha: bb - ba 9  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment. 
The entry and final regression models are:
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Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + UNEMP + T + CONSTANT
Table 29
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Kentucky, 2-year public® (N=270)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 1093.315 260.274 4.201 .000
UNEMP -126.955 52.164 -.186 -2.434 .016
T -35.194 13.422 -.289 -2.622 .009
INSTTUIT 208 .071 .363 2.943 .004
Note: R= .185, R Square = .034, Adjusted R Square = .023.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (3, 269) = 3.157, p<.025 is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 2 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .023) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), unemployment (UNEMP), and 
time (T). Almost 98 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the 
variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this 
state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of in-state 
tuition (INSTTUIT), unemployment (UNEMP), and time (T). Unemployment (UNEMP)
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and time (T) both had a negative impact on 2-year public enrollment, while average in­
state tuition (INSTTUIT) had a significant positive effect on enrollment. Accept Ho since 
there was not a significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact on enrollment.
Kentucky, 4-Year Publie 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a signifieant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + TTT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2, 87) = 18.041, p<.OOI is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Almost 28 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .281) of the 
variation in enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and the long (TTT) 
term impact of the policy adoption. Nearly 72 percent of the variance is due to other 
factors other than the variables included in the original entry model which were stepped 
out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative 
predictive power of in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and the long (TTT) term impact of the 
policy adoption. The long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoption had a significant 
negative effect on enrollment for this sector. Finally, average in state tuition (INSTTUIT) 
had a significant positive impact on enrollment at 4-year pubic institutions in Kentucky. 
Reject Ho since there was a significant long term (TTT) impact on enrollment.
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Table 30
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Kentucky, 4-year public** (N=88)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -224.985 363.468 -.619 .538
TTT -184.323 57.671 -.480 -3.196 .002
INSTTUIT .933 .166 .845 5.621 .000
Note: R= .546, R Square = .298, Adjusted R Square = .281.
“ Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Kentucky 2-Year Private 
There were not a sufficient number of institutions to conduct an analysis of this sector in 
this state.
Kentucky. 4-Year Private 
Ho: hb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb - ha ^ 0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = TTT + INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2,236) = 22.059, p<.OOI is below the a<  .05 threshold.
The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 15 percent (adjusted R  ̂= .151) of the variation
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in enrollment is explained by in state tuition (INSTTUIT) and the long term (TTT) 
impact of the policy adoption. Almost 85 percent of the variance is due to other factors 
other than the variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not 
significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive 
power of in state tuition (INSTTUIT) and the long term (TTT) impact of the policy 
adoption. Accept Ho since there was no significant long (TTT) or short term impact on 
enrollment.
Table 31
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Kentucky, 4-year private** (N=237)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 127.307 16.853 7.554 .000
TTT -6.755 4.014 -.108 -1.683 .094
INSTTUIT .012 .002 .423 6.606 .000
Note: R= .398, R Square = .159, Adjusted R Square = .151.
“ Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Louisiana. 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment. 
Ha: hb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment. 
The entry and final regression models are:
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Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT 
Final model: ENROLL = HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TTT + UNEMP + CONSTANT
Table 32
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Louisiana, 2-year public^ (N=8)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 1801.022 781.623 -2.304 .022
HSGRAD .031 .018 .118 1.703 .089
INSTTUIT .781 .047 .600 16.663 .000
T 23.977 13.747 .230 1.744
TTT -49.394 16.363 -.346 -3.019 .003
UNEMP 80.273 28.850 .186 2.782 .006
Note: R= .597, R Square = .356, Adjusted R Square = .350.
* Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (5,519) = 56.803, p<.OOI is below the a<  .05 threshold.
The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Almost 35 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.350) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by unemployment (UNEMP), the number of high school 
graduates (HSGRAD), the long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoption, and time (T). 
Nearly 65 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included
III
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in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of unemployment, the number of 
high school graduates (HSGRAD), the long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoption, 
average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), and time (T). The long term (TTT) impact of the 
policy adoption on two year pubic enrollment was negative. However, the impact of the 
number of high school graduates (HSGRAD), average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), time 
(T), and unemployment (UNEMP) all had a positive impact on 2-year public enrollment 
in Louisiana. Reject Ho since there was a significant long term (TTT) impact of the 
policy adoption on enrollment.
Louisiana. 4-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba 9  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL -  INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (1,155) = 28.515, p<.OOI is below the a<  .05 threshold. 
Table 33 provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 15 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.I5I) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT). Almost 85 percent of the 
variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the entry model which 
were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) 
estimates relative predictive power of in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), which had a positive
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relationship to enrollment. Aceept Ho since there was no long (TTT) or short (TT) term
impact of the policy adoption.
Table 33
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Louisiana, 4-year public® (N=156)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant)
INSTTUIT
-314.304 398.530 
.921 .173 .395
-.789
5.340
.432
.000
Note: R= ,395, R Square = .156, Adjusted R Square = .151.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Louisiana. 2-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
There was significant missing data for in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) for the 
institutions in this sector, which is why that variable was not included in the entry model. 
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP 
Final model: ENROLL = HSGRAD + TT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2,7) = 38.985, p<.001 is below the a<  .05 threshold. Table 
34 provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard error 
for the final model. Nearly 92 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.916) of the variation in enrollment
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is explained by the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD) and the short term (TT) 
impact of the policy adoption. Almost 8 percent of the variance is due to other factors 
other than the variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not 
significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive 
power of the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD) and the short term (TT) 
impact of the policy adoption. Reject Ho since there was a significant immediate (TT) 
impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
Table 34
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Louisiana, 2-year private® (N=8)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 248.367 25.486 9.745 .000
HSGRAD -.006 .001 -1.271 -8.772 .000
TT 12.684 1.953 .941 6.493 .001
Note: R= .969, R Square = .940, Adjusted R Square = .916.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Louisiana. 4-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment. 
Ha: bb-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment. 
The entry and final regression models are:
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Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2,117) = 109.039, p<.001 is below the a< .05 threshold. 
The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 65 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.649) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time (T). Almost 35 
percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
original entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and 
time (T). Time (T) had a negative impact on 4-year private enrollment, while average in­
state tuition (INSTTUIT) had a significant positive effeet on enrollment. Accept Ho since 
there was no significant impact for the long (TTT) or short (TT) term
Table 35
Regression Analysis Coeffieients, Final Model, for Louisiana, 4-Year Private® (N=l 18)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 14.292 57.471 .249 .804
INSTTUIT .060 .004 .842 14.664 .000
T -20.023 7.374 -.156 -2.716 .008
Note: R= .809, R Square = .655, Adjusted R Square = .649.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
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Michigan, 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba A 0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT + UNEMP 
Final model: ENROLL = HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + UNEMP + CONSTANT
Table 36
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Michigan, 2-Year Public® (N=249)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -1864.295 400.342 -4.657 .000
HSGRAD .051 .008 .450 6.740 .000
UNEMP 66.326 25.843 .151 2.566 .011
INSTTUIT -.188 .033 -.376 -5.660 .000
Note: R= .425, R Square = .181, Adjusted R Square = .171.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (3,248) = 18.053, p<.001 is below the a<  .05 threshold. 
Table 36 provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 17 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.171) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), unemployment
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(UNEMP), and the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD). Almost 83 percent of 
the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the original entry 
model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients 
(beta) estimates relative predictive power of average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), 
unemployment (UNEMP), and the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD). The 
impact of average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) was negative and significant. The impact 
of the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD) and unemployment (UNEMP) were 
both positive and significant for 2-year public institutions. Accept Ho since there was no 
significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
Michigan. 4-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2, 167) = 7.511, p<.OOI is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 7 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.072) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time (T). Almost 
92 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of average in-state tuition 
(INSTTUIT) and time (T). The impact of the time (T) on enrollment was negative but
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not significant and the impact of average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) was positive and 
significant for 4-year institutions. Accept Ho since there was no significant short (TT) or 
long (TTT) term impact on enrollment.
Table 37
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Michigan, 4-Year Public® (N=I68)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 581.529 228.863 2.541 .012
T -46.305 24.739 -.176 -1.872 .063
INSTTUIT .326 .085 .361 3.829 .000
Note: R= .289, R Square = .083, Adjusted R Square = .072.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Michigan. 2-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = HSGRAD + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2,64) = 3.690, p<.03I is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and
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standard error for the final model. Nearly 8 percent (adjusted =.078) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by time (T) and the number of high school graduates 
(HSGRAD). Almost 82 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the 
variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this 
state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of time (T) and 
the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD). The impact of high school graduates 
(HSGRAD) on enrollment was significantly negative while the impact of time was 
positive and significant for 2-year private institutions. Accept Ho since there was no 
significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact on enrollment.
Table 38
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Michigan, 2-Year Private® (N=65)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3066.463 1344.091 2.281 .026
HSGRAD -.066 .030 -1.033 -2.203 .031
T 73.684 29.051 1.189 2.536 .014
Note: R= .326, R Square = .106, Adjusted R Square = .078.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Michigan. 4-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
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Ha: by-ba^  0, the poliey adoption did have a significant effeet on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = HEAPP + INSTTUIT + UNEMP + CONSTANT
The significance of F (3, 443) = 56.247, p<.001 is below the a<  .05 threshold.
The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 27 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.272) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), unemployment 
(UNEMP), and higher education appropriations (HEAPP). Almost 73 percent of the 
variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the entry model which 
were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) 
estimates relative predictive power of unemployment (UNEMP), average in-state tuition 
(INSTTUIT), and higher education appropriations (HEAPP). The impact of the higher 
education appropriations (HEAPP) and unemployment (UNEMP) on four year private 
enrollment were significant and negative. However, the impact of the average in-state 
tuition (INSTTUIT) was positive and significant. Accept Ho since there was no 
significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact on enrollment.
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Table 39
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Michigan, 4-Year Private® (N=444)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 561.586 169.366 3.316 .001
HEAPP -4.44E-007 .000 -.231 -3.876 .000
UNEMP -55.877 20.026 -.162 -2.790 .005
INSTTUIT .037 .003 .555 12.987 .000
Note: R= .526, R Square = .277, Adjusted R Square = .272.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Missouri, 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba 9  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (1,265) = 5.471, p=.020 is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Only about 2 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.017) of the 
variation in enrollment is explained by average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT). Nearly 98 
percent o f the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the
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entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of average in-state tuition 
(INSTTUIT). The impact of average in-state tuition was positive and significant. Accept 
Ho since there was no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact on enrollment.
Table 40
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Missouri, 2-Year Public® (N=266)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant)
INSTTUIT
641.335 190.318 
.175 .075 .142
3.370
2.339
.001
.020
Note: R= .142, R Square = .020, Adjusted R Square = .017.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Missouri. 4-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba 9  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + T + TTT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (3, 167) = 9.637, p<.001 is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and
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standard error for the final model. Nearly 13 percent (adjusted =.134) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by time (T), the long term (TTT) effects of the policy 
adoption, and the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT). Almost 87 percent of the 
variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the entry model which 
were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) 
estimates relative predictive power of time (T), the long term (TTT) effects of the policy 
adoption, and the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT). The impact of time and average 
in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) on enrollment was positive and significant. The long term 
(TTT) impact of the policy adoption was negative and significant on enrollment in 4-year 
public institutions in Missouri. Reject Hq since there was a significant long (TTT) term 
impact on enrollment.
Table 41
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Missouri, 4-Year Public® (N=I68)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -497.423 621.342 -.801 .425
T 252.126 120.878 .396 2.086 .039
TTT -394.831 194.738 -.394 -2.027 .044
INSTTUIT .448 .085 .405 5.259 .000
Note: R= .387, R Square = .150, Adjusted R Square = .134.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
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Missouri. 2-Year Private and 4-Year Private 
In Missouri, the 2-year private and 4-year private did not yield models that were 
significant for enrollment.
Mississippi. 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: h b-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + HEAPP + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F (3, 223) = 3.743, p<.012 is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 4 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.036) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), higher education 
appropriations (HEAPP), and time (T). Almost 96 percent of the variance is due to other 
factors other than the variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not 
significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive 
power of in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), higher education appropriations (HEAPP), and 
time (T). Accept Ho since there was no significant short (TT) or long (TTT) term impact 
on enrollment.
124
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 42
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Mississippi, 2-year public® (N=224)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coeffieients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 2281.263 720.246 3.167 .002
HEAPP -I.59E-006 .000 -.264 -1.735 .084
T 126.552 46.130 .532 2.743 .007
INSTTUIT -.863 .501 -.188 -1.724 .086
Note: R= .260, R Square = .049, Adjusted R Square = .036.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Mississippi, 4-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb-ha#  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT+ UNEMP 
Final model: ENROLL = HEAPP + INSTTUIT + T + TT + CONSTANT
The signifieance of F (4,111) = 27.045, p<.OOI is above the a<  .05 threshold.
The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 48 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.484) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), the short term (TT) impact of 
the policy adoption, higher education appropriations (HEAPP) and time (T). Almost 52
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percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), the 
short term (TT) impact of the policy adoption, higher education appropriations (HEAPP) 
and time (T). The impact of time (T) on enrollment was negative and significant. The 
impact of average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and higher education appropriations 
(HEAPP) were positive and significant on enrollment in 4-year public institutions in 
Mississippi. The short (TT) and long (TTT) term impact of the policy adoption was 
positive but not significant at the a<  .05 level so accept H».
Table 43
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Mississippi, 4-Year Public® (N=I 12)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -2653.152 433.144 -6.125 .000
HEAPP I.92E-006 .000 .497 3.323 .001
T -259.571 32.883 -1.702 -7.894 .000
TT 329.348 176.127 .257 1.870 .064
INSTTUIT 1.484 .143 1.337 10.386 .000
Note: R= .709, R Square = .503, Adjusted R Square = .484.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
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Mississippi. 2-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb-ha^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT + UNEMP 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + UNEMP + CONSTANT
Table 44
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Mississippi, 2-Year Private® (N=23)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 222.349 119.723 1.857 .078
UNEMP 22.415 10.623 .361 2.II0 .048
INSTTUIT -.049 .016 -.513 -2.997 .007
Note: R= .780, R Square = .608, Adjusted R Square = .569.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (2,22) = 15.526, p<.OOI is below the a<  .05 threshold.
Table 44 provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 57 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.569) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and unemployment (UNEMP). 
Almost 43 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included
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in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and 
unemployment (UNEMP). The impact of average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) was 
negative and significant on enrollment in 2-year private institutions in Mississippi. 
Unemployment (UNEMP) had a significant positive impact on enrollment. Accept the 
Ho since there was no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact on enrollment.
Mississippi, 4-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ba^ 0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT + UNEMP 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2,137) = 61.203, p<.OOI is above the a<  .05 threshold.
The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 47 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.468) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by time (T) and the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT). 
Almost 53 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included 
in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of time (T) and the average in-state 
tuition (INSTTUIT). The impact of time (T) on enrollment was negative and significant. 
The impact of average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) was positive and significant on 
enrollment in 4-year private institutions in Mississippi. Accept Ho since there was no 
significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact.
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Table 45
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Mississippi, 4-Year Private® (N=138)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 38.482 18.938 2.032 .044
T -6.420 2.081 -.205 -3.086 .002
INSTTUIT .026 .002 .734 11.032 .000
Note: R= .690, R Square = .476, Adjusted R Square = .468.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
New Mexico, 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba 9  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a signifieant effeet on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2, 29) = 18.753, p<.OOI is below the a <  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized eoeffieients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 55 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.550) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time (T). Almost 45 
pereent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard
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coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and
time (T). Aceept Ho since there was no signifieant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact
of the policy adoption on enrollment.
Table 46
Regression Analysis Coeffieients, Final Model, for New Mexico, 2-Year Public® (N=30)
Unstandardized
Coeffieients
Standardized
Coeffieients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -5401.529 1173.729 -4.602 .000
INSTTUIT 8.064 I.3I8 1.192 6.120 .000
T -423.139 92.910 -.887 -4.554 .000
Note: R= .763, R Square = .581, Adjusted R Square = .550.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
New Mexico. 4-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: hb-ha^  0, the poliey adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + HSGRAD + CONSTANT
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Table 47
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for New Mexico, 4-Year Public® (N=30)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -445.543 412.129 -1.081
HSGRAD -.095 .034 -.249 -2.754 .010
INSTTUIT 1.660 .147 I.0I9 11.271 .000
Note; R= .915, R Square = .838, Adjusted R Square = .826.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (2, 29) = 69.874, p<.001 is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 83 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.826) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and the number of high school 
graduates (HSGRAD). Almost 17 percent of the variance is due to other factors other 
than the variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant 
in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of in­
state tuition (INSTTUIT) and the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD). In-state 
tuition (INSTTUIT) had a significant and positive impact on enrollment in 4-year 
institutions, whereas the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD) had a negative and 
significant impact on 4-year public enrollment. Accept Ho since there was no signifieant 
long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
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New Mexico, 2-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ba# 0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = TT + UNEMP + CONSTANT
Table 48
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for New Mexico, 2-Year Private® (N=9)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 1592.601 325.982 4 j# 6 .003
TT -401.950 87.866 -1.335 -4.575 .004
UNEMP -180.014 45.040 -1.166 -3.997 .007
Note: R= .885, R Square = .782, Adjusted R Square = .710.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (4,8) = 10.793, p<.010 is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 71 percent (R^ =.710) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained the immediate impact (TT) of the poliey adoption and
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unemployment (UNEMP). Almost 29 pereent of the variance is due to other faetors other 
than the variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant 
in this state. The standard eoeffieients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the 
immediate impaet of the policy adoption (TT) and unemployment (UNEMP). Both the 
immediate impact (TT) of the policy adoption and unemployment (UNEMP) had a 
significant negative impaet on enrollment in 2-year private institutions. Reject Ho since 
there was a significant short (TT) term impact of the poliey adoption on enrollment.
New Mexico 4-Year Private 
The New Mexico 4-year private institution models did not yield any significant 
results because there were not enough institutions with reported data in this category in 
the state to analyze.
Nevada. 2-Year Public 
Nevada, 2-year public did not yield a significant model for the effect of the 
adoption of the merit aid policy on enrollment.
Nevada, 4-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (I, 364) = 4.747, p=.030 is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 1 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.010) of the variation
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in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT). Almost 99 
percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the impact of the average in­
state tuition (INSTTUIT), which had a significant and negative impact on enrollment. 
Accept Ho since there was no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact of the 
policy adoption on enrollment.
Table 49
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Nevada, 4-Year Public® (N=365)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant)
INSTTUIT
511.935 37.125 
-.016 .007 -.114
13.789
-2.179
.000
.030
Note: R= .410, R Square = .013, Adjusted R Square = .010.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Nevada, 2-Year Private 
There are no 2-year private institutions in Nevada.
Nevada, 4-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment. 
Ha: bb - ba ^ 0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
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The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
Table 50
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Nevada, 4-Year Private® (N=42)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 43.292 31.585 1.371 .178
INSTTUIT .006 .002 .410 2.841 .007
Note: R= .410, R Square = .168, Adjusted R Square = .147.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (1, 41) = 8.070, p=.007 is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 15 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.147) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by in-state tuition (INSTTUIT). Almost 85 percent of the 
variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the entry model which 
were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) 
estimates relative predictive power of in-state tuition (INSTTUIT). Accept Ho since there 
was no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption on 
enrollment.
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South Carolina, 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + T + UNEMP + CONSTANT
Table 51
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for South Carolina, 2-Year Public® 
(N=252)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 248.777 181.854 1.368 .173
INSTTUIT -.299 .088 -386 -3.390 .001
T 71.968 18.067 .423 3.983 .000
UNEMP 89.310 35.897 .180 2.488 .014
Note: R= .251, R Square =.063, Adjusted R Square = .052.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (3, 251) = 5.580, p<.001 is below the a<  .05 threshold. 
Table 51 provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. Nearly 7 percent (R  ̂=.065) of the variation in enrollment is
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explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), time (T), and unemployment 
(UNEMP). Almost 93 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the 
variables ineluded in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this 
state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the impact 
of the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), time (T), and unemployment (UNEMP).
Both time (T) and unemployment (UNEMP) had a significant positive effect on 
enrollment, while the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) had a significant negative 
impact. Accept Ho since there was no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact 
of the policy adoption on enrollment.
South Carolina, 4-Year Public 
Analysis of the 4-year public sector in South Carolina did not yield a significant
model.
South Carolina, 2-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba 9  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T -I- TT 4- TTT+ HEAPP -I- HSGRAD + UNEMP -+- INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2, 16) = 50.340, p<.001 is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Almost 86 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.860) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time (T). 
Nearly 14 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included
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in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the impact of the average in­
state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time (T). The time (T) trend for enrollment in this sector 
was significant and negative. Average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) had a significant 
positive effect on enrollment in the 2-year private sector. Accept Ho since there was no 
significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
Table 52
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for South Carolina, 2-Year Private® 
(N=17)
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 43.906 38.511 1.140 .273
INSTTUIT .057 .006 .968 10.005 .000
T -12.912 3.840 -.325 -3.362 .005
Note: R= .937, R Square =.878, Adjusted R Square = .860.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
South Carolina. 4-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment. 
Ha: bb-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment. 
The entry and final regression models are:
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Entry model; ENROLL^ T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
Table 53
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for South Carolina, 4-Year Private® 
(N=269)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant)
INSTTUIT
227.690 30.976 
.006 .003 .141
7.350
2.328
.000
.021
Note: R= .141, R Square =.020 , Adjusted R Square = .016 
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The signifieance of F (1, 268) = 5.419, p<.021, whieh is below the a< .05 
threshold. Table 53 provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, 
and standard error for the final model. Nearly 2 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.016) of the 
variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT). Almost 
98 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the impact of the average in­
state tuition (INSTTUIT), whieh had a significant and positive impact on enrollment.
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Accept Ho since there was no signifieant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impaet of the
policy adoption on enrollment.
Tennessee. 2-Year Public 
All of the Tennessee analyses were done without the long term (TTT) dummy 
variable because the policy has only been in place for one year.
Ho; bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a signifieant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba 9  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a signifieant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
Table 54
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Tennessee, 2-Year Public® (N=256)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant)
INSTTUIT
368.685 189.886 
.384 .123 .316
1.942
3.130
.055
.002
Note: R= .316, R Square =.100 , Adjusted R Square = .090 
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (1,89) = 9.794, p<.002, which is below the a<  .05 
threshold. Table 54 provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients.
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and standard error for the final model. Nearly 9 percent (adjusted =.090) of the 
variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT). Almost 
91 percent o f the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
entry model whieh were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the impact of the average in­
state tuition (INSTTUIT). Accept Ho since there was not a signifieant long (TTT) or 
short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
Tennessee. 4-Year Public 
The analysis of Tennessee’s 4-year public sector did not yield a signifieant model.
Tennessee. 2-Year Private 
All of the Tennessee analyses were done without the long term (TTT) dummy 
variable because the policy has only been in place for one year.
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a signifieant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= INSTTUIT + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2,18) = 4.724, p<.024, whieh is below the a<  .05 
threshold. The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized 
coefficients, and standard error for the final model. Nearly 29 percent (adjusted R^
=.293) of the variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition 
(INSTTUIT) and time (T). Almost 71 percent of the variance is due to other factors other 
than the variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant
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in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the 
impact of the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time (T). Accept Ho since there 
was not a signifieant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption on 
enrollment.
Table 55
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Tennessee, 2-Year Private® (N=I9)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 102.725 40.777 2.519 .023
T -15.864 7.462 -.432 -2.126 .049
INSTTUIT .017 .006 .534 2.629 .018
Note: R= .609, R Square =.371 , Adjusted R Square = .293
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Tennessee. 4-Year Private 
All of the Tennessee analyses were done without the long term (TTT) dummy 
variable because the policy has only been in place for one year.
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba 9  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT
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Final model: ENROLL= INSTTUIT + T + CONSTANT 
Table 56
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Tennessee, 4-Year Private® (N=255)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -32.871 39.052 -.842 .401
T -18.235 7.130 -.132 -2.558 .011
INSTTUIT .035 .003 .630 12.225 .000
Note: R= .610, R Square =.373 , Adjusted R Square = .368
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The signifieanee of F (2,254) = 74.838, p<.001, which is below the a<  .05 
threshold. Table 56 provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, 
and standard error for the final model. Nearly 37 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.368) of the 
variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time 
(T). Almost 63 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables 
included in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The 
standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the impaet of the 
average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time (T). Accept Ho since there was not a 
signifieant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impaet of the policy adoption on enrollment.
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Washington. 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a signifieant effect on enrollment.
Ha: by-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= HSGRAD + HEAPP + T + TT + TTT + UNEMP + 
CONSTANT
The significance of F (6,255) = 52.122, p<.001, which is below the a <  .05 
threshold. The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized 
coefficients, and standard error for the final model. Nearly 55 percent (adjusted R  ̂
=.546) of the variation in enrollment is explained by higher education appropriations 
(HEAPP), the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD), unemployment (UNEMP), 
the long (TTT) and short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption, and time (T). Almost 
44 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
entry model whieh were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the impact of time (T), which 
had a significant and negative effect on enrollment; the higher education appropriations 
(HEAPP), the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD), the long (TTT) and short 
(TT) term impact of the policy adoption, and unemployment (UNEMP), all of which had 
significant and positive impact on enrollment. Reject Ho since there was a signifieant 
long (TTT) and short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
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Table 57
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Washington, 2-Year Publie® (N=256)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -46176.45 5568.368 -8.293 .000
HEAPP 2.65E-005 .000 3.212 8.533 .000
HSGRAD .210 .040 .700 5.205 .000
T -3285.565 313.007 -8.380 -10.497 .000
TT 897.969 425.776 .431 2.109 .036
TTT 3152.241 312.608 2.455 10.084 .000
UNEMP 2424.117 215.873 2.786 11.229 .000
Note: R= .746, R Square =.557 , Adjusted R Square = .546 
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Washington, 4-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: by-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= INSTTUIT + T + CONSTANT
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Table 58
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Washington, 4-Year Public® (N=48)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -5390.703 783.430 -6.881 .000
INSTTUIT 2.825 .303 1.258 9.339 .000
T -489.572 77.251 -.854 -6.337 .000
Note: R= .815, R Square =.664 , Adjusted R Square = .649
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (2, 47) = 44.439, p<.001, which is below tbe a<  .05 
threshold. The figure below provides tbe unstandardized coefficients, standardized 
coefficients, and standard error for the final model. Nearly 65 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.649) 
of the variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) 
and time (T). Almost 35 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the 
variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this 
state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the impact 
of average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time (T). The average in-state tuition 
(INSTTUIT) had a significant and positive effect on enrollment. Time (T) had a 
significant negative impact on enrollment. Accept Ho since there was no significant long 
(TTT) or short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
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Washington. 2 Year Private 
Washington, 2 year private had N=2, which was not enough observations to 
analyze the impaet of the policy adoption in that sector.
Washington. 4-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a signifieant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ba# 0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= INSTTUIT + HEAPP + CONSTANT
The signifieanee of F (2,119) = 63.728, p<.OOI, which is below the a<  .05 
threshold. The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized 
coefficients, and standard error for the final model. Almost 51 percent (adjusted R  ̂
=.513) of the variation in enrollment is explained by higher education appropriations 
(HEAPP) and the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT). Nearly 49 percent of the variance 
is due to other factors other than the variables included in the entry model whieh were 
stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates 
relative predictive power of the impact of average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and the 
higher education appropriations (HEAPP). Higher education appropriations (HEAPP) 
had a negative and significant effect on enrollment in the 4-year private institutions. The 
average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) had a signifieant and positive effect on enrollment. 
Accept Ho since there was no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact of the 
policy adoption on enrollment.
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Table 59
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for Washington, 4-Year Private® (N=120)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 459.249 194.783 2.358 .020
HEAPP -5.53E-007 .000 -.236 -3.501 .001
INSTTUIT .037 .003 .761 11.290 .000
Note: R= .722, R Square =.521 , Adjusted R Square = .513
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
West Virginia. 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba ^ 0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= INSTTUIT + TTT + HEAPP + CONSTANT
The significance of F (4, 42) = 1.926, p<.003, which is below the a<  .05 
threshold. The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized 
coefficients, and standard error for the final model. Nearly 29 pereent (adjusted =.294) 
of the variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), 
the long term (TTT) impaet of the policy adoption, and higher education appropriations 
(HEAPP). Almost 71 pereent of the variance is due to other factors other than the
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variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this 
state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the average 
in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), the long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoption, and 
higher education appropriations (HEAPP). The average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) had 
a significant negative effect on enrollment. The long term (TTT) impact of the policy 
adoption and higher education appropriations (HEAPP) both had a negative and 
significant impact on 2-year public enrollment in West Virginia. Reject Ho since tbere 
was a significant long (TTT) term impaet of the policy adoption on enrollment.
Table 60
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for West Virginia, 2-Year Public® (N=43)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3263.136 935.269 3.489 .001
HEAPP -6.95E-006 .000 -.496 -2.840 .007
INSTTUIT -.193 .064 -.408 -3.030 .004
TTT -118.554 63.658 -.325 -1.862 .070
Note: R= .543, R Square =.294 , Adjusted R Square = .294 
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
West Virginia, 4-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
149
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ha: by - ba 9̂  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= INSTTUIT + CONSTANT
Table 61
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for West Virginia, 4-Year Public® (N=88)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant)
INSTTUIT
261.441 209.401 
.352 .100 .356
1.249
3.532
.215
.001
Note: R= .356, R Square =.127 , Adjusted R Square = .117 
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (1,87) = 12.476, p<.001, which is below the a<  .05 
threshold. Table 61 provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, 
and standard error for the final model. Nearly 12 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.117) of the 
variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT). Almost 
88 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the impaet of average in-state 
tuition (INSTTUIT). The average in-state tuition had a significant and positive effect on
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enrollment. Accept Ho since there was no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term
impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
West Virginia. 2-Year Private 
No signifieant model eould be developed because there were only two 
observations for West Virginia’s 2-year private institutions.
West Virginia. 4-Year Private 
West Virginia, 4-year private did not yield any significant models from the 
analysis.
Research Question 4 (RQ4)
Research Question 4 (RQ4): What is the effect of the following three types of 
merit aid programs across similar programs by sector and level: a. Full tuition; b. Partial 
tuition; c. One time payment?
Full Tuition Program. 2-Year Publie 
Ho: by - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= INSTTUIT 4- HSGRAD 4- HEAPP + UNEMP + CONSTANT 
The significance of F (4, 1968) = 141.821, p<.001, which is below the a<  .05 
threshold. Table 62 provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, 
and standard error for the final model. Almost 22 pereent (adjusted R  ̂=.223) of the 
variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), the
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number of high school graduates (HSGRAD), higher education appropriations (HEAPP), 
and unemployment (UNEMP). Nearly 78 pereent o f the variance is due to other factors 
other than the variables included in the entry model whieh were stepped out as not 
significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive 
power of the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), higher education appropriations 
(HEAPP), the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD), and unemployment 
(UNEMP). The long (TTT) and short (TT) term impaet of the policy adoption were both 
stepped out of the equation and had no significant impact on enrollment across 2-year 
public institutions in states with full merit scholarship programs therefore accept Ho.
Table 62
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for 2-Year Public Institutions Across Full 
Tuition Payment Merit Scholarship States® (N=1960)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -992.339 150.184 -6.607 .000
HEAPP 2.70E-007 .000 .201 2.992 .003
HSGRAD .009 .002 .275 4.476 .000
INSTTUIT .164 .040 ^89 4.124 .000
UNEMP 120.711 23.301 .129 5.181 .000
Note: R= .473, R Square =.224 , Adjusted R Square = .223 
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
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Full Tuition Program, 4-year public 
Ho: by - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: by - ba 9  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a signifieant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= INSTTUIT + TTT + TT + T + HEAPP + CONSTANT
The significance of F (5, 764) = 69.470, p<.001, which is below the a<  .05 
threshold. The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized 
coefficients, and standard error for the final model. Nearly 31 pereent (adjusted R  ̂=.309) 
of the variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), 
the long (TTT) and short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption, time (T), and higher 
education appropriations (HEAPP). Almost 69 percent of the variance is due to other 
factors other than the variables included in the entry model whieh were stepped out as not 
signifieant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive 
power of the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), the long (TTT) and short (TT) term 
impact of the policy adoptions, time (T), and unemployment (UNEMP). The long term 
(TTT) impaet of the policy adoption had a positive but not significant impact on 
enrollment across 4-year public institutions in states with full merit scholarship programs. 
Higher education appropriations (HEAPP), the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and 
the short term (TT) impact of the policy adoption all had a significant positive effect on 
enrollment across 4-year public institutions in states that had full tuition payment merit 
aid programs. Time (T) had a significant and negative impact on enrollment in this
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sector. Reject Ho since there was a signifieant short (TT) term impact of the policy
adoption on enrollment.
Table 63
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for 4-Year Public Institutions Across Full 
Tuition Payment Merit Scholarship States® (N=765)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -460.720 194.186 -2.373 .018
HEAPP 1.06E-006 .000 .548 15.001 .000
INSTTUIT .802 .081 .323 9.842 .000
T -143.255 23.829 -.519 -6.012 .000
TT 259.746 130.915 .098 1.984 .048
TTT 59.556 33.724 .147 1.766 .078
Note: R= .560, R Square =.314 , Adjusted R Square = .309 
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Full Tuition Program. 2-Year Private 
Ho: by - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: by-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT
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Final model: ENROLL= HSGRAD + T + TTT + CONSTANT 
Table 64
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for 2-Year Private Institutions Across 
Full Tuition Payment Merit Scholarship States® (N=208)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 83.482 53.514 1.560 .120
HSGRAD .001 .001 .128 1.802 .073
T 13.148 6.244 .411 2.106 .036
TTT -17.812 8.372 -.414 -2.128 .035
Note: R= .196, R Square =.038 , Adjusted R Square = .024 
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (4, 207) = 2.453, p=.047, which is below the a< .05 
threshold. The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized 
coefficients, and standard error for the final model. Nearly 2 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.024) 
of the variation in enrollment is explained by the number of high school graduates 
(HSGRAD), time (T), and the long term (TTT) impact of the merit programs. Almost 98 
percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables ineluded in the 
entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of the number of high school
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graduates (HSGRAD), the long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoptions, and time (T). 
The long term (TTT) impact of the policy adoption had a significant negative impact on 
enrollment across 2-year private institutions in states with full merit seholarship 
programs. The number of high school graduates (HSGRAD) had a positive, but not 
signifieant, effect on enrollment. Time (T) had a signifieant positive effect on 
enrollment. Rejeet Ho sinee there was a significant long (TTT) term impact of the poliey 
adoption on enrollment.
Full Tuition Program. 4-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba 9̂ 0, the poliey adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= INSTTUIT + HEAPP + HSGRAD + TT + UNEMP + 
CONSTANT
The signifieanee of F (5, 1174) = 73.060, p<.001, which is below the a<  .05 
threshold. Table 65 provides the unstandardized eoefficients, standardized eoefficients, 
and standard error for the final model. Nearly 24 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.235) of the 
variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), the 
number of high school graduates (HSGRAD), higher education appropriations (HEAPP), 
unemployment (UNEMP), and the short term (TT) impaet of the merit programs. Almost 
76 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables ineluded in the 
entry model which were stepped out as not signifieant in this state.
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Table 65
Regression Analysis Coeffîeients, Final Model, for 4-year Private Institutions Across Full 
Tuition Payment Merit Scholarship States® (N=I 175)
Unstandardized
Coeffîeients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 168.017 78.743 2.134 .033
HEAPP -3.09E-007 .000 -.706 -5.725 .000
HSGRAD .007 .001 .619 5.695 .000
INSTTUIT .033 .002 .503 18.502 .000
TT 63.875 33.393 .087 1.913 .056
UNEMP -37.243 12.337 -.109 -3.019 .003
Note: R= .488, R Square =.238 , Adjusted R Square = .235 
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The standard coeffîeients (beta) estimates relative predietive power of the average 
in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD), the short 
term impact (TT) of the poliey adoptions, and unemployment (UNEMP). The short term 
(TT) impaet of the policy adoption had a positive but not significant impact on 
enrollment aeross 4-year private institutions in states with full merit scholarship 
programs. Higher education appropriations (HEAPP) and the unemployment rate 
(UNEMP) both had a signifieant negative impaet on enrollment. Finally, the number of 
high school graduates (HSGRAD) and the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) both had
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a significant positive effect on enrollment aeross 4-year private institutions in states that 
had full tuition payment merit aid programs. Accept Ho since there was no signifieant 
long (TTT) or short (TT) term impaet of the poliey adoption on enrollment.
Partial Tuition Program. 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a signifieant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba ^  0, the poliey adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= HEAPP + T + TT + TTT + HSGRAD+ CONSTANT
The signifieanee of F (5, 1575) = 13.719, p<.001, whieh is below the a <  .05 
threshold. The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized 
coefficients, and standard error for the final model. Nearly 4 pereent (adjusted R  ̂=.039) 
of the variation in enrollment is explained by the higher education appropriations 
(HEAPP), the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD), time (T), and the short (TT) 
and long (TTT) term impaet of the policy adoption. Almost 96 percent of the variance is 
due to other factors other than the variables included in the entry model which were 
stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates 
relative predictive power of the higher education appropriations (HEAPP), the number of 
high school graduates (HSGRAD), time (T), and the short (TT) and long (TTT) term 
impact of the poliey adoption. Higher education appropriations (HEAPP) and the short 
(TT) and long (TTT) term impact of the policy adoption all had a significant positive 
impact on enrollment in 2-year public institutions in states with partial tuition payment 
merit aid programs. The number of high school graduates (HSGRAD) and time (T) both
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had a significant negative effect on enrollment. Reject Hq since there was a significant
long (TTT) and short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
Table 66
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for 2-Year Public Institutions Across 
Partial Tuition Payment Merit Scholarship States® (N=1576)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 1151.449 74.737 15.407 .000
HEAPP 5.02E-007 .000 .206 5.017 .000
HSGRAD -.013 .002 -.240 -6.051 .000
T -105.694 17.027 -.594 -6.207 .000
TT 155.230 59.514 .110 2.608 .009
TTT 105.823 18.666 .472 5.669 .000
Note: R= .205, R Square =.042 , Adjusted R Square = .039 
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Partial Tuition Program. 4-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT
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Final model; ENROLL= HEAPP + INSTTUIT + T + CONSTANT 
Table 67
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for 4-Year Public Institutions Across 
Partial Tuition Payment Merit Scholarship States® (N=854)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 553.409 97.376 5.683 .000
HEAPP 6.95E-007 .000 .214 5.974 .000
INSTTUIT .156 .031 .190 4.972 .000
T -27.489 7.417 -.129 -3.706 .000
Note: R= .329, R Square =.108 , Adjusted R Square = .105 
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (3, 853) = 34.413, p<.001, which is below the a<  .05 
threshold. The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized 
coefficients, and standard error for the final model. Nearly 11 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.105) 
of the variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), 
time (T), and higher education appropriations (HEAPP). Almost 89 percent of the 
variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the entry model which 
were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) 
estimates relative predictive power of the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), time (T),
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and higher education appropriations (HEAPP). Higher education appropriations 
(HEAPP) and the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) both had a significant positive 
effect on enrollment across 4-year public institutions in states that had partial tuition 
payment merit aid programs. Time (T) had a significant negative impact on enrollment 
in this sector. Accept Ho since there was no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term 
impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
Partial Tuition Program. 2-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= INSTTUIT + TT + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2, 196) = 15.561, p<.001, which is below the a<  .05 
threshold. The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized 
coefficients, and standard error for the final model. Nearly 13 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.129) 
of the variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) 
and the short (TT) term impact of the policy adoption. Almost 87 percent of the variance 
is due to other factors other than the variables included in the entry model which were 
stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates 
relative predictive power of the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and the short term 
(TT) impact of the policy adoption. Average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) had a 
significant positive impact on enrollment in 2-year private institutions in states with 
partial tuition payment merit aid programs. The short term (TT) impact of the merit aid
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policies was significantly negative. Reject Hq since there was a significant short (TT)
term impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
Table 68
Linear Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for 2-Year Private Institutions 
Across Partial Tuition Payment Merit Scholarship States® (N=197)
Unstandardized Standardized t Sig.
Coefficients Coefficients
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 87.023 21.914 3.971 .000
INSTTUIT .018 .003 .365 5.425 .000
TT -43.555 21.809 -.134 -1.997 .047
Note: R= .372, R Square =.138 , Adjusted R Square = .129
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
Partial Tuition Program. 4-vear private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL= UNEMP + HEAPP + INSTTUIT + HSGRAD + CONSTANT
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Table 69
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for 4-Year Private Institutions Across 
Partial Tuition Payment Merit Scholarship States® (N=1687)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 189.446 42.127 4.497 .000
HEAPP -2.02E-007 .000 -.207 -6.862 .000
HSGRAD .002 .001 .096 3.408 .001
INSTTUIT .024 .001 .483 20.099 .000
UNEMP -13.062 5.369 -.057 -2.433 .015
Note: R= .457, R Square =.209 , Adjusted R Square = .207 
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (4,1686) = 110.861, p<.001, which is below the a<  .05 
threshold. Table 69 provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, 
and standard error for the final model. Nearly 21 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.207) of the 
variation in enrollment is explained by the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), the 
number of high school graduates (HSGRAD), unemployment (UNEMP), and higher 
education appropriations (HEAPP). Almost 79 percent of the variance is due to other 
factors other than the variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not 
significant in this state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive 
power of the average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), the number of high school graduates
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(HSGRAD), unemployment (UNEMP), and higher education appropriations (HEAPP). 
Higher education appropriations (HEAPP) and the unemployment rate (UNEMP) both 
had a significant negative effect on enrollment across 4-year private institutions in states 
that had partial tuition payment merit aid programs. Average in-state tuition 
(INSTTUIT) and the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD) both had a significant 
positive effect on enrollment across 4-year private institutions in the partial payment 
merit aid states. Accept Ho since there was no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term 
impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
One Time Pavment. 2-Year Public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba ^ 0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= HEAPP + HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + T + TT + TTT + UNEMP 
Final model: ENROLL = HSGRAD + INSTTUIT + UNEMP + CONSTANT
The significance of F (3,248) = 18.053, p<.OOI is below the a<  .05 threshold.
The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. More than 17 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.171) of the 
variation in enrollment is explained by average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), 
unemployment (UNEMP), and the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD). Almost 
83 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of average in-state tuition 
(INSTTUIT), unemployment (UNEMP), and the number of high school graduates
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(HSGRAD). The impact of average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) was negative and 
significant. The impact of the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD) and 
unemployment (UNEMP) were both positive and significant for 2-year public 
institutions. Accept Ho since there was no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term 
impact of the policy adoption on enrollment.
Table 70
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for One Time Payment, 2-Year Public® 
(N=249)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) -1864.295 400.342 -4.657 .000
HSGRAD .051 .008 .450 6.740 .000
UNEMP 66.326 25.843 .151 2.566 .011
INSTTUIT -.188 .033 -.376 -5.660 .000
Note: R= .425, R Square = .181, Adjusted R Square = .171.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
One Time Pavment. 4-vear public 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment. 
Ha: bb - ba 7  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment. 
The entry and final regression models are:
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Entry model; ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = INSTTUIT + T + CONSTANT
Table 71
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for One Time Payment, 4-Year Public® 
(N=168)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 581.529 228.863 2.541 .012
T -46.305 24.739 -.176 -1.872 .063
INSTTUIT 326 .085 .361 3.829 .000
Note: R= .289, R Square = .083, Adjusted R Square = .072.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
The significance of F (2, 167) = 7.511, p<.001 is below the a <  .05 threshold. 
Table 71 provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and standard 
error for the final model. More than 7 percent (adjusted R  ̂-.072) of the variation in 
enrollment is explained by average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) and time (T). Nearly 93 
percent o f the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of average in-state tuition 
(INSTTUIT) and time (T). The impact of the time (T) on enrollment was negative but
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not significant and the impact of average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) was positive and
significant for 4-year institutions. Accept Hq since there was no significant short (TT) or
long (TTT) term impact on enrollment.
One Time Pavment. 2-Year Private 
Ho; bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb - ba 7  ̂0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT 4- TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP 4- INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = HSGRAD + T + CONSTANT
The significance of F (2,64) = 3.690, p<.031 is below the a<  .05 threshold. The 
figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. Nearly 8 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.078) of the variation 
in enrollment is explained by time (T) and the number of high school graduates 
(HSGRAD). Almost 82 percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the 
variables included in the entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this 
state. The standard coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of time (T) and 
the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD). The impact of high school graduates 
(HSGRAD) on enrollment was significantly negative while the impact of time was 
positive and significant for 2-year private institutions. Accept Ho since there was no 
significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact on enrollment.
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Table 72
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for One Time Payment, 2-year private® 
(N=65)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 3066.463 1344.091 2.281 .026
HSGRAD -.066 .030 -1.033 -2.203 .031
T 73.684 29.051 1.189 2.536 .014
Note: R= .326, R Square = .106, Adjusted R Square = .078.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
One Time Pavment. 4-Year Private 
Ho: bb - ba= 0, the policy adoption did not have a significant effect on enrollment.
Ha: bb-ba^  0, the policy adoption did have a significant effect on enrollment.
The entry and final regression models are:
Entry model: ENROLL= T + TT + TTT+ HEAPP + HSGRAD + UNEMP + INSTTUIT 
Final model: ENROLL = HEAPP + INSTTUIT + UNEMP + CONSTANT
The significance of F (3, 443) = 56.247, p<.OOI is below the a<  .05 threshold. 
The figure below provides the unstandardized coefficients, standardized coefficients, and 
standard error for the final model. More than 27 percent (adjusted R  ̂=.272) of the 
variation in enrollment is explained by average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), 
unemployment (UNEMP), and higher education appropriations (HEAPP). Nearly 72
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percent of the variance is due to other factors other than the variables included in the 
entry model which were stepped out as not significant in this state. The standard 
coefficients (beta) estimates relative predictive power of unemployment (UNEMP), 
average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT), and higher education appropriations (HEAPP). The 
impact of the higher education appropriations (HEAPP) and unemployment (UNEMP) on 
four year private enrollment were significant and negative. However, the impact of the 
average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) was positive and significant. Accept Hq since there 
was no significant long (TTT) or short (TT) term impact on enrollment.
Table 73
Regression Analysis Coefficients, Final Model, for One time payment, 4-year private® 
(N=444)
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Final Model B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 561.586 169.366 3.316 .001
HEAPP -4.44E-007 .000 -.231 -3.876 .000
UNEMP -55.877 20.026 -.162 -2.790 .005
INSTTUIT .037 .003 .555 12.987 .000
Note: R= .526, R Square = .277, Adjusted R Square = .272.
® Dependent Variable: First time undergraduate enrollment (ENROLL), a  = .05
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Summary
Chapter 5 presented the graphs of the time series data and the results of the time 
series regression analyses of the data. In all, the longitudinal data for each sector in the 
15 states in this study were graphed to determine the onset and duration of the impact the 
policy adoption had. The analysis consisted of a backward multiple linear regressions to 
identify the predictive value and relationship between the merit aid policy adoption and 
first time undergraduate enrollment in the 15 states that have adopted these policies and 
across the three types of merit aid programs.
Based on Long’s (2003) work on the impact of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship on 
institutions and tuition, three variables were identified as having significant impact: state 
higher education appropriations, unemployment, and average tuition for in-state students. 
Because the number of high school graduates in a state is directly linked to the number of 
potential candidates for undergraduates, this study also accounts for the number of public 
high school graduates in each state.
Research question 3 was an examination of the impact of the policy adoption on 
the four sectors within each state that has a merit aid policy. The policy adoption had a 
significant short term impact on enrollment in four cases. In Alaska and Washington, 
there was a significant positive relationship between the adoption of the policy at the state 
level and short term enrollment in 2-year public institutions. In Kentucky, there was a 
significant positive relationship between the policy adoption and short term enrollment in 
2-year private institutions in that state. And, in Nevada there was a negative relationship 
between the policy adoption and the short term enrollment at the 2-year private sector 
institution.
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There was a significant long term impact of the policy adoption on 2-year public 
institutions in four cases. In Alaska, Louisiana, and West Virginia, there was a 
significant negative relationship between the policy adoption and enrollment in the 2-year 
public institutions. In Washington, there was a significant positive relationship between 
the policy adoption and enrollment in the 2-year public intuitions. There was a 
significant long term impact on 2-year private institutions in two cases. In Arkansas, 
there was a negative relationship between the policy adoption and enrollment at 2-year 
private institutions. In Florida, there was a positive relationship between the 
implementation of the policy and enrollment at 2-year privates. The impact on 4-year 
public institutions interestingly only had a significant impact in one state, Missouri, 
which had a negative relationship. The long term impact of the policy adoption on 4-year 
private institutions was significant in only three states, Arkansas, Florida, and West 
Virginia, all three of which were negative.
Research question 4 was an examination of the impact of merit aid programs 
across similar programs by sector and level. There was no significant long or short term 
impact on enrollment in 2-year public or 4-year private institutions after the policy 
adoption of full payment tuition plans. Full tuition merit scholarship programs did have a 
significant long term negative effect on enrollment at 2-year private institutions across 
the six states with these programs. 4-year public institutions were significantly and 
positively impacted by the full tuition merit aid policies.
Partial tuition programs did not have a significant impact on enrollment in 4-year 
public and private institutions. There was no significant long or short term impact on 
enrollment in 2-year private institutions after the adoption of partial tuition payment
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plans. There was a significant and positive long and short term effect at 2-year public 
institutions across the six states that have adopted the partial payment programs.
Finally, in the state that had a one time payment program, there was no significant 
effect on enrollment in any of the sectors (2, 4-year, public or private).
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This final chapter begins with a broad presentation of each research question and 
broad interpretation of the results. Then, the findings are supported using specific state 
examples or results. Finally, implications for higher education policy are discussed as are 
recommendations for future study. For this study, Tong term effect’ means that there was 
a significant impact on enrollment from year-to-year after the policy adoption, whereas 
the ‘immediate impact’ or ‘short term effect’ is the impact of the policy adoption on just 
the first year after implementation.
Summary of Results 
Research question I : How has merit aid impacted first time undergraduate 
postsecondary participation in each of the states that has adopted this student financial aid 
policy?
Research question one (RQl) is a state level analysis of how merit aid has 
impacted first time undergraduate postsecondary participation in each of the states that 
have adopted these student financial aid policies. The overall impact of the adoption of 
the merit aid policies is that they have had a significant effect on enrollment across nine 
of the fifteen states in this study. Specifically, they have had a significant positive,
immediate effect on enrollment across Florida, Termessee, and West Virginia but a
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significant negative, immediate effect on enrollment in Nevada and Alaska. The long 
term effect has been significant and positive in Alaska, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Missouri, and New Mexico but significantly negative in Arkansas, (see Appendix D for 
full results). There was no significant long or short term effect in only three states, 
Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi, and South Carolina.
Merit aid programs, at a state level, seem to have a positive impact on enrollment 
which could be because they encourage participation somewhere in the system. Another 
possibility is that as states prepare for these initiatives, there is generally more public 
discussion about college costs, participation, and preparation. As issues rise to the 
forefront of public discussion, the level of the general knowledge around the issue 
increases. In this case, as more publicity surrounds the adoption of the merit aid policies, 
students and parents are more likely to have discussions about postsecondary education 
and paying for college.
In addition to the impact of the policy adoption, unemployment had an impact on 
participation across six of the states in this study. Unemployment had a significant 
negative impact in Nevada and Alaska and a significant positive effect in Arkansas, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina. It could be that there was a significant 
negative relationship between unemployment and enrollment in Nevada and Alaska 
because in these states, higher education is not necessarily associated with employment 
as strongly as it is in other states. Particularly in Nevada, with a large proportion of the 
population employed in the construction and service industries, education might not offer 
the same incentive as it does in other states.
In South Carolina, there was no significant change in enrollment upon the
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adoption of the first merit aid policy, which may explain why there was another program 
adopted less than five years later. The second set of merit aid policies that was adopted 
in South Carolina had a significant positive impact on enrollment. Where most states 
have adapted their merit aid policies to allow for differential awards by sector. South 
Carolina has taken the approach of writing new legislation for new award programs. 
There are currently four different merit scholarships available in South Carolina. The 
interaction effects of these four scholarship programs make it difficult to determine the 
impact of any one of the programs at this broad level of analysis. One assumption of 
time series analysis is that there are no other alternative explanations for the 
phenomenon. In the case of South Carolina, there are clearly several different legislative 
initiatives in higher education occurring simultaneously.
In Washington, there was not a significant effect on enrollment upon adoption of 
the merit aid policy which may have been a factor in why the program ended on June 30, 
2006. The award amount in Washington was $1,254.00, whereas the 2005 average 4- 
year public tuition was $4,630; 2-year public was $2, 230; and 4-year private was 
$ 18,300. This payment was significantly less than 50 per cent in terms of proportion of 
tuition paid by the award, which may explain why students did not respond by enrolling 
at significantly higher numbers.
There was one state where the adoption of the merit aid policy had a significant 
negative long-term impact on enrollment—Arkansas. It is evident from the graph of 
enrollment in Arkansas that there are large fluctuations in enrollment from year to year. 
There were five data points before the policy adoption and thirteen after, which may not 
be sufficient data for enrollment trends pre-policy adoption. A longer pre-policy
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adoption time series might show that over a longer period, the impact of the policy is in 
fact positive or neutral. Arkansas requires that students take a core set o f courses in high 
school, achieve a minimum grade point average, and ACT or SAT score. Additionally, 
unlike most of the merit aid programs in other states, Arkansas has a $60,000 family 
income cap for recipients with one child, and makes additional allowances for families 
with more children (Arkansas Department of Higher Education, 2006). An unintended 
consequence of the family income cap is that it could also contribute to the decline in 
enrollment because students who are eligible in merit but exceed the income cap may be 
selecting schools in other states because they did not receive the grant to stay in 
Arkansas.
The short term impact of the merit aid policies was mixed; in Florida, Tennessee 
and West Virginia, the adoption of the merit aid policies had a significant positive effect 
on short-term enrollment. Tennessee and West Virginia adopted their policies less than 
five years ago and so are only used as an indicator of the initial enrollment response. The 
incentive effect of merit aid policies across the states appears to gain momentum rather 
than to have a sudden consistent impact on college going. Part of the reason for the lag in 
student enrollment response is that the criterion for an award is based on four years of 
performance (grade point average) or a score on a test (ACT or SAT) taken in the junior 
year, both events that took place before the legislation. In Alaska and Nevada, the short 
term impact was significant and negative. As with all legislation, when merit aid policies 
are adopted in states, financing does not necessarily immediately accompany the 
legislation. In the case of merit aid, because these programs can be cumbersome and 
expensive to implement, there can be a lag in the response by students because of
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structural issues with the programs.
Research Question 2: What is the effect of the following three types of merit aid 
programs on first time undergraduate enrollment across states (a) full tuition payment 
programs, (b) partial tuition payment programs, (c) one time payment programs?
Full Tuition Payment Programs
In the aggregated states where there was a full tuition payment policy adopted, 
there was no significant long or short term impact of the policy adoption on enrollment. 
There is a significant increasing enrollment trend in the full tuition payment states over 
time (T) that is unrelated to the policy adoption. Higher education appropriations 
(HEAPP), the number of high school graduates (HSGRAD), and unemployment 
(UNEMP) all significantly affected enrollment in the full tuition payment merit aid states. 
Higher education appropriations are a reflection of the general fiscal welfare of the state 
and its citizens. Earlier studies have shown that merit aid disproportionately benefits 
students that come from advantaged backgrounds who are already likely to go to college 
(Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2003; Dynarski, 2003; Heller & Rasmussen, 2003). By 
extension, the adoption of a merit aid policy might not have a significant enrollment 
effect in states with higher appropriations. In states where full merit aid policies are 
adopted, unemployment (UNEMP) had a significant positive effect on postsecondary 
enrollment. In states where education is a clear vehicle to better paying jobs, going to 
college right after high school makes sense. Since there is a significant positive 
relationship between the number of high school graduates and undergraduate enrollment 
in these states, it appears that students are doing just that.
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Finally, in full tuition payment policy states, the average in-state tuition 
(INSTTUIT) had a significant negative effect on enrollment. There is a history of 
research that supports the finding that as tuition rises, the number of students enrolling 
decreases. What is interesting about this case is that the relationship persists even in 
states where there is a full tuition payment program in place to defray tuition costs. In 
her 2003 study of how Georgia institutions responded to the adoption of the HOPE 
scholarship policy. Long found that institutions may have increased fees, room and 
board, and other associated costs rather than just tuition. The linkage between rising 
tuition and associated fees may be a phenomenon that is occurring across all of the full 
tuition payment merit aid states.
Partial Tuition Pavment Programs 
The aggregated state level analysis found that the partial tuition payment 
programs had no significant immediate impact but that they did have a significant 
negative long term impact on enrollment. One possible explanation for the negative long 
term results where the partial tuition programs are in place is that there is wide variation 
between policies across the states as well as within the same state policy from year to 
year. There are two main areas of variance across partial tuition payment merit aid 
programs—selection criteria and award amount. For example, in Nevada the criterion for 
award was a 3.0 grade point average at a Nevada high school whereas in Washington, 
students were required to be in the top 15% of their graduating class. That difference in 
criteria alone would likely lead to significant differences in the number of students 
eligible for the merit awards and the impact on enrollment, especially across states that 
are pooled together for analytical purposes.
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Another possible reason that the policy adoption across partial payment merit aid 
states has had a negative impact on enrollment is that the eligibility requirements for the 
merit aid scholarships have changed in almost every state since their adoption. One of 
the reasons for the changes in eligibility criteria is that the money to pay for the 
scholarships comes from limited resources such as tobacco dollars or lottery revenues, 
with only a very few states using general revenues. As the number of students eligible 
for the award increases faster than the revenues is growing, states are forced to make 
decisions about how to stretch limited resources by either reducing the amount of award 
or the number of eligible students.
Like the full tuition payment states, the partial tuition payment states also 
demonstrated significant positive relationships between enrollment and higher education 
appropriations, the number of high school graduates, and unemployment. It is likely that 
the same reasons behind the positive relationship between enrollment and appropriations 
(wealth), graduates (supply and preparation), and unemployment (incentives) in the full 
tuition states are the same underlying causes of the significant relationships in the partial 
tuition states.
One Time Pavment
The analysis of the single one time payment state, Michigan, revealed that there 
was not a significant long or short term impact of the policy adoption on enrollment. The 
one time tuition payment in this state is only $2500, significantly less than the average 
cost of tuition at a 4-year public institution in the state. Since the policy is a one time 
payment, and it is the only state with that policy, it is not possible to determine if  that 
alone is the reason that there was no incentive effect. However, in their 2003 study of
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the incentive effect of Michigan’s merit aid policy, Heller and Rogers speculated that this 
relatively low one time payment did not sufficiently off-set the cost of tuition enough to 
serve as an incentive to enroll.
Research Question 3; How much has merit aid impacted participation by sector 
and level in the states that have adopted this financial aid policy?
2-Year Public Sector 
There was a significant increase in student enrollment in the 2-year public 
institutions immediately after the adoption of the merit aid policies in Alaska and 
Washington. Many of the states did not have any effect after the adoption of the merit 
aid program. The 2-year public enrollment did not immediately significantly decline in 
any of the states. However, there was a significant negative effect of the merit aid 
adoption over a longer period in Alaska, Louisiana, and West Virginia. This is an 
important finding because earlier work on merit aid suggested that it pulls students from 
2-year institutions up to the 4-year institutions (Dynarski, 2002). This study suggests that 
while that might be the case over long periods of time, it is not the immediate impact of 
the program. Furthermore, if  students who were not inclined to enroll are more likely to 
enroll at 2-year institutions because of merit aid, they could be taking the place of those 
students who are now incentivized to move up to 4-year institutions.
Average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) significantly positively influenced 
enrollment in 2-year public institutions in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, New 
Mexico, and Tennessee. A likely reason is that as tuition in 4-year institutions raises, 
students enroll in the less expensive 2-year institutions. Additionally, unemployment 
(UNEMP) had a significant positive effect on enrollment in 2-year public institutions.
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This finding is not surprising, as 2-year public institutions are often where workers turn 
to retool for new jobs. Finally, since 2-year public institutions are a place where many 
students begin their postsecondary educational journey, it is not surprising to find that the 
number of high school graduates (HSGRAD) is also positively associated with 2-year 
public enrollment in Georgia, Michigan, and Washington.
4-Year Public Sector 
Across nearly every state, the adoption of the merit aid policies do not have a 
significant short or long term impact on 4-year public enrollment. Part of the reason that 
there was no significant effect of the merit aid adoption on enrollment in this sector may 
be that many 4-year public institutions are at or near capacity and do not have room to 
take significantly more students. Another reason may be that the students that benefit 
from these programs are students that would enroll at 4-year public institutions regardless 
of the merit aid adoption. In their examination of the New Mexico Lottery Scholarship 
program. Binder, Ganderton, and Hutchens (2001) found that the merit aid policy did not 
influence whether students went to college or not but rather where they went to college.
The average in-state tuition (INSTTUIT) has a significant positive impact on 
enrollment in the 4-year sector in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Missouri, Mississippi, New Mexico, and West Virginia. As average in state tuition 
increases in these nine states, the number of students that enroll in 4-year public 
institutions also significantly increases. One reason could be that parents and students are 
aware of the benefits of higher education and believe that the cost will not go down in the 
future. Hoping to take advantage of current prices, students enroll despite rising tuition 
costs. Another possibility simply concerns supply and demand. Student enrollment
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demand for the 4-year sector in these states may be higher than the spaces available 
(supply). An economic consequence of an imbalance whereby demand is greater than 
supply is a rise in prices (tuition). If this is the case in these states, students demand is 
inelastic relative to other states.
Nevada was the only state in which there was a significant negative effect of the 
average in-state tuition on enrollment. Here again, Nevada is a state in which the 
perceived return on higher education is less than that of other states so when tuition rises, 
enrollment in the 4-year public institutions decreases.
The adoption o f a merit aid policy had a significant negative long term effect on 
enrollment in the 4-year public sector in Missouri. The merit scholarship program in 
Missouri offers the top three percent of students who take the ACT or SAT in Missouri 
one thousand dollars per semester twice per year for up to ten semesters (Missouri 
Department of Higher Education, 2006). It is highly likely that these same students are 
being recruited to private institutions or institutions in other states because of their 
academic successes.
2-Year Private Sector 
The adoption of a merit aid policy had a significant effect on enrollment across 
two states—Arkansas and Kentucky. In Arkansas, there was a significant negative effect 
of the merit aid adoption on enrollment in the 2-year private sector. Kentucky 
experienced a positive, immediate impact on enrollment but there was no significant long 
term effect. It should be noted that in the case of Kentucky, there was only one 2-year 
private institution’s data that were included in this study. That is not to say that there is 
only one 2-year private institution in the state, but rather this sector did not consistently
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report its enrollment data. For a list of all of the institutions that were omitted from this 
study due to missing data, please refer to Appendix E.
4-Year Private Sector 
The adoption of a merit aid policy had a significant negative impact on enrollment 
across the 4-year private sector in two states, Arkansas and West Virginia. The 
enrollment in the 4-year private institutions in Arkansas, Florida, and West Virginia 
dropped over the long run (TTT) as a result of the adoption of the merit aid policies in 
those states. For the majority of states, there was no significant impact on enrollment in 
the 4-year private as a result of the scholarship program adoption. There were no states 
where there was a significant immediate drop in enrollment as a result of a merit aid 
policy adoption. One reason that there was not a significant effect may be that in many 
4-year private institutions, there are sufficient institutional grant dollars to recruit high 
achieving students. Often, students enroll at 4-year private institutions for their prestige, 
regardless of cost.
This study found that there is a significant decreasing trend in enrollment over 
time (T) at the 4-year private institutions in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia, all other variables constant.
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Table 74
Impact of Policy Adoption by Sector
Sector
Impact 2-Year Publie 4-Year Public 2-Year 4-Year
Private Private
Short Term (TT) AK + KY +
WA +
Long Term A K - M O - A R - A R -
(TFT) L A - FL + F L -
WA + W V -
wv-
+ there was a significant positive impact, — there was a significant negative impact.
Another variable that was significant in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina, and Tennessee was the 
average in state tuition (INSTTUIT), which had a significantly positive effect on 
enrollment in the 4-year private institutions. One reason that this may be the case is that 
in several states, enrollment in private institutions is allowed as part of the merit aid 
grant. Another possible reason that enrollment in private 4-year institutions rises as 
tuition increases may be that students begin to view private institutions as a viable 
alternative past a certain tuition cost.
Research Question 4 (RQ4): What is the effect of the following three types of 
merit aid programs across similar programs by sector and level: (a) Full tuition; (b)
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Partial tuition; (c) One time payment?
Full Tuition Policies
The analysis of the impact of the policy adoptions in the four sectors across states 
with similar merit aid programs shows that the full tuition programs have a significant 
impact on the 2-year private and 4-year pubic sectors. There was no significant model 
for the 2-year public or the 4-year private sectors.
The 2-year private sector enrollment significantly decreases over the long term 
(TTT) as a result of the full tuition policy adoption across all full tuition states in this 
study. One reason for this may be that the merit aid programs educate students about 
their alternatives before they select an institution. Another reason may be that these 
institutions are not eligible to receive merit aid money so students that receive the grants 
select institutions in either the public or the 4-year private sectors.
There was a significant short term (TT) increase in enrollment in the 4-year public 
sector as a result of the adoption of a full tuition payment across the states in this study. 
One reason for this may be that the publicity of the programs increases awareness, which 
encourages students to go to college. However, the momentum is not sustained, as there 
was not a significant long term effect (TTT).
Partial Tuition Policies
The states with partial tuition programs had a significant positive long and short 
term enrollment effect at the 2-year public sector across the states. In other words, the 
effect of the policy adoption in the partial tuition states was immediate and long term in 
the 2-year public sector. It is likely that the 2-year public sector is where students, who 
otherwise would not have considered college before the merit aid policy adoption,
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matriculated. The publicity that surrounds the adoption of merit aid policies in states can 
encourage first generation students and parents to think about and plan for college. A 
marginal payment may not encourage people to believe they can afford a 4-year 
institution, but it is enough for them to be encouraged to attend a 2 year. That there were 
significant immediate and long terms effects on enrollment in the 2-year sector after 
merit aid adoption supports this suggestion.
One Time Pavment Policies 
In Michigan, the one state with a one time payment program, there were no 
significant effects of the adoption of the merit aid policy in any of the sectors across the 
state. It seems as though this supports the assertion that the combination of amount of 
award ($2500) and length of time of support (one year) do not serve as an effective 
incentive for participation in postsecondary education. Another possible explanation is 
that students are enrolling at the next most prestigious level of institution and new 
students are entering the pipeline through 2-year public institutions so that the end result 
is no significant changes in enrollment in any of the sectors across the state. Table 78 
(below) summarizes the significant findings concerning the impact of the three merit aid 
policy types across states by sector.
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Table 75
Impact of Policy Type by Sector
Sector
Policy Type 2-Year Public 4-Year 
Public
2-Year 4-Year 
Private Private
Full Tuition Program Short Term+ Long Term-
Partial Tuition Program
One Time Payment 
Tuition Program
Long Term+ 
Short Term+
Short Term-
+ denotes a significant positive effect, - denotes a significant negative effect.
Comparison with Existing Literature 
Results of this study were largely consistent with the research literature on the 
impact of merit aid on postsecondary student enrollment. As in other previously reported 
research, state wide adoption of a merit aid policy had a significant effect on student 
enrollment (Heller, 1999; Farrell, 2004). Much of the existing research on merit aid is 
devoted to understanding how state policies effect student enrollment by group, systems, 
and institutions. This study provides a state level examination across states and across 
similar merit aid programs thereby expanding the work done by Farrell (2004), Dynarski
(2003) and Heller (1999), among others. Farrell conducted an evaluation of the merit aid 
programs in her 2004 dissertation and recommended further examination at the sector
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level. Dynarski conducted a state level examination of the merit aid programs in her 
2003 study, but limited her study to those in the Southern Regional Education Board 
(SREB) states. Heller’s 1999 study examined the impact of merit aid studies using a 
cross sectional time series analysis of the states that had the policies at that time. This 
current study includes more states than any of the previous studies and examines the 
impact one level deeper by including a sector level analysis.
Previous analyses of the impact of merit aid on sector enrollment found that 
students responded to the combination of financial aid along with the tuition increases 
that often accompany these policies (Heller, 1999; Pema & Titus, 2004; Kane, 1999). 
This study supports those findings, but adds more detail to the general claims of the 
previous work, as demonstrated by the long and short term increase in enrollment at the 
2-year public institutions with the adoption of partial merit aid programs.
McLendon, Heller, and Young (2006) as well as Cohen-Vogel and Ingle (2006) 
conducted examinations of how these state policies transfer across state lines and how 
they come to be adopted in neighboring states. However, merit aid policy transfer is not 
limited to crossing just state borders; Canada now has a Millennium Scholarship similar 
to the merit aid programs in the United States. Canada is not alone; Heller and Rogers
(2004) present implications of the policy transfer of similar higher education policies in 
the European Union. Research on how these policies impact regions, institutions, and 
students will become increasingly more important as merit aid grows in its utility as a 
policy tool across the world. While overall, merit aid policies do increase enrollment 
across states, the impact of the merit aid on institutions and sectors can vary depending 
on the type of policy that is adopted.
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Implications for Policy 
The context of the state may override merit aid policy adoptions as in Arkansas 
and Nevada. However, there is evidence that long-term effects on enrollment are 
positive, especially at the broad state level. Questions remain concerning increased 
enrollment for whom. The impact of merit scholarships on minority enrollment has been 
examined by several researchers with the preponderance of evidence finding that 
underrepresented students in higher education remain underrepresented in the merit 
scholarship programs (Farrell, 2004; Cornwell & Mustard, 2002, 2004; Dynarski, 2002; 
Binder, Ganderton, & Hutchens, 2002). Also, if policy makers want to utilize a certain 
sector for cost savings, there is evidence that this may have some credibility. For 
example, if states wish to encourage citizens to go to community colleges because of 
fiscal austerity, they may be able to deemphasize expensive university enrollment. This 
study shows that a partial payment plan encourages two-year enrollment and can 
therefore offer a viable alternative to legislators. It is important to note, however, that a 
full payment plan may not have the same effect on shifting enrollment in the same 
manner, across sectors.
This study also provides a sector level examination across and within states such 
that policy makers and higher education administrators would be able to use the models 
to predict the changes in enrollment in their state or sector. It is important that state 
legislators understand the impact of these policies at the sector and state level for two 
main reasons. The first is that as legislators determine whether or not to adopt or adapt 
their merit aid policies, they need to consider the higher education capacity in their state. 
If policy makers adopt policies that exclude private sectors, this study shows that there
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can be a negative impact on the private sector institutions in the state. Also, there is 
reason to believe that despite the type of merit aid policy, the amount of the award 
matters, as demonstrated by Washington and Michigan. In other words, not only should 
the policy provide incentive for the first year, but it appears as though the amount of 
support through the later years also matters.
Higher education administrators need to be aware of how these policies impact 
their institutions and be able to prepare for changes that may arise as a result of the 
adoption of a merit aid policy; this study helps them to do that. By providing models 
that administrators can utilize in their states to predict enrollment changes, administrators 
can allocate resources to accommodate increases in enrollment. Additionally, if  the 
model predicts that there will be a decrease in a sector as a result of the adoption; 
administrators can play an active role in determining the sectors that are eligible in the 
allocation of the awards.
Implications for Future Research 
The states in which there was no significant impact of merit aid on enrollment 
bring to light some of the shortcomings of this pooled and time series regression. First, 
by using self reported secondary data, several issues arise. The data are at the discretion 
of the person or institution that is doing the reporting. Since these data cannot be verified 
by an outside source, there is no way to determine if the numbers are accurate for any 
given year. Additionally, because reporting of these data was not required until 1992, 
there were several institutions that did not report their early data (NCES, 2006). Finally, 
institutions that did not have Program Participation Agreements (PPAs) with the U.S. 
Department of Education did not have to complete the survey in any year. These
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agreements are in place for institutions that receive federal funding under Title IV of the 
Higher Education Act. As a result of these data issues, this study may not fully capture 
the impact of the merit aid adoptions on private institutions since the institutions in this 
sector made up the bulk of the un- or underreported data.
In the case of Georgia, there was a single year of data (2000) that was an outlier 
that was not removed from the analysis. Since these data were not smoothed, this outlier 
had a larger effect on the regression line than it would if these data year were discarded 
or smoothed. A follow up analysis of the smoothed state data using the centered moving 
average revealed that the impact of time (T) and unemployment (UNEMP) on enrollment 
(ENROLL) were both significantly positive. This analysis shows that by maintaining the 
outlier in the analysis, even smoothed, there is a still a significant negative impact of the 
adoption on enrollment in Georgia.
Another issue with this study is that because there were high correlations between 
the independent variables, there may be multicollinearity. For example, there is a 
consistently high correlation between time (T) and the long term effect variable (TTT) 
due to the way that they were coded. Because of the nature of this study, measuring 
change over time, it was necessary to include both variables despite the multicollinearity 
that may exist.
There are several ways in which this study can be improved upon and expanded. 
The first is that by having only three broad characterizations of the merit aid policy, the 
estimate of the effects on enrollment are overly generalized. The exact amount of the 
award as a predictor of enrollment might provide a clearer picture of the enrollment 
response. A case can also be made for including the criteria of the award programs as an
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indicator of enrollment, similar to the study done by Heller (2004). A study that 
examines the programs by selection criteria or award amounts would be useful for 
determining how these factors influence enrollment in merit aid states. Another useful 
examination might be to characterize the merit programs by amounts rather than payment 
types, which would lead to a finer differentiation of programs and their effects.
One important aspect of research on merit aid is what happens to students once 
they are enrolled. This study does not include students beyond their first year, but a more 
thorough examination of student retention, transfer, and remedial course taking would 
provide even more insight as to the student response to state policies. St. John and 
Starkey (1995) and St. John (2004) conducted earlier studies of the persistence of 
students receiving financial aid but a study of the year to year retention throughout the 
merit aid states has yet to be thoroughly examined.
In order to better understand the choices that students are making in response to 
merit aid policies, one of the best places to turn for information is the students 
themselves. An additional recommendation to improve this research is to conduct a 
qualitative study of how and when students generally find out about the programs, how 
they think about selecting a college once they decide they want to try to get a merit 
scholarship, how they perceive their institutional and sector level choices, and if there is a 
strategy about how they will take advantage of the opportunity. A similar study could be 
done of university administrators from the various sectors to determine if  there are 
differences in how they perceive merit aid programs and the impact on their institutions 
and sectors.
192
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
REFERENCES
Ackerman, R.L., Young, M; & Young, R. (2005). A state-supported, merit-based 
scholarship program that works. Journal o f  Student Financial Aid, 35 (3).
Acosta (2001). How do colleges respond to changes in federal student aid? Working 
Paper #808, Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles. 
Arkansas Department of Higher Education (2006). Academic Challenge Scholarship 
rules and regulations, downloaded from
http://www.arkansaschallenge.com/pdfs/ACS Rules June 2005.pdf 
Binder, Ganderton, & Hutchens (2001). Who benefits from a lottery-funded college
subsidy? Evidence from the New Mexico Success Scholarship. Social Science 
Research Network.
Bingham & Felbinger (2002). Evaluation in practice: A methodological approach. New 
York: NY, Chatham House Publishers of Seven Bridges Press, EEC.
Buss, C., Parker, J. & Rivenburg, J. (2004). Cost, quality and enrollment demand at 
liberal arts colleges. Economics of Education Review, 23, 57-65.
Cohen-Vogel, L. & Ingle, K. (2006). When a state’s neighbors matter most: Diffusion 
and postsecondary policy adoption. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA.
Cornwell, C. and Mustard, D. (2003). Race and the effects of Georgia’s HOPE
Scholarship. In D.E. Heller & P. Marin (Eds.), Who should we help? The
negative consequences o f  merit scholarships (pp. 57-72). Cambridge, MA: The
243
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Civil Rights Project, Harvard University. Retrieved from 
www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights 
Cornwell, C., Mustard, D., & Sridhar, D. (2003). The enrollment effects o f  merit-based 
financial aid: Evidence from  G eorgia’s HOPE Scholarship. Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia, Terry College of Business, Economics Department.
Doyle, W. R., Delaney, J.A., & Naughton, B. A. (2004). Institutions amplifying state 
policy. Change (July/August), 36-41.
Dynarski, S. (2001). “Does aid matter? Measuring the effects of student aid on college 
attendance and completion.” John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty 
Research working paper. Harvard University.
Dynarski, S. (2002). Race, income, and the impact of merit aid. In D.E. Heller & P. 
Marin (Eds.), Who should we help? The negative consequences o f  merit 
scholarships (pp. 73-91). Cambridge, MA: The Civil Rights Project, Harvard 
University. Retrieved from www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights 
Dynarski, S. (2003). The new merit aid. Boston, MA: Harvard University, Kennedy 
School of Government and NBER.
Education Commission of the States, (2005). M erit scholarships. Retrieved from 
http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/61/40/6140.htm on November 25, 2005.
The Eleanor Roosevelt papers: The human rights years, 1945-1962. An online historical 
site located at George Washington University. Retrieved on August 7, 2005 from 
http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/abouteleanor/q-and-a/glossarv/nva.htm 
Epple, D., Romano, R., & Sieg, H. (2002). On the demographic composition of colleges 
and universities in market equilibrium. The American Economic Review, 92(2)
244
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
[Papers and proceedings of the one hundred fourteenth annual meeting of the 
American Economic Association, Atlanta, GA, January 4-6, 2002 (May 2002), 
310-314.
Farrell, P.L. (2005). An evaluation of the effectiveness of state non-needs merit-based 
scholarship programs (Doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 2005). 
Dissertation Abstracts International, 65(09), 3299.
FinAid for Educators and FAAs. History of financial aid page. Retrieved on August 7, 
2005 from http://www.finaid.org/educators/historv.phtml
Gladieux, L. E. (2003). Student assistance the American way. Washington, DC: 
Educational Policy Institute, Inc. Retrieved on August 7, 2005 from 
http://www.educationalpolicv.org/pdf/Student Assistance.pdf
Gladieux, L. E. & Pema, L. W. (2005). Borrowers who drop out: A neglected aspect o f  
the college student loan trend. The National Center for Public Policy and Higher 
Education, Report #05-2.
Gladieux, L. E. & Swail, W. S. (1999). Financial aid is not enough. In: King, J.E. (ed.). 
Financing College Education: How it works. How i t ’s Changing. American 
Council on Education. Oryx Press: Westport, CT.
Heller, D. E. (2004). The devil is in the details: An analysis o f  eligibility criteria fo r  
merit scholarships in Massachusetts. In D.E. Heller & P. Marin (Eds.), State 
merit scholarship programs and racial inequality. Cambridge, MA: The Civil 
Rights Project at Harvard University.
Heller, D.E. (Jul/Aug2004). The changing nature o f  financial aid. Academe, 90(4), 36- 
39.
245
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Heller, D. (2003). M erit scholarships and incentives fo r  academic performance. Paper 
presented at the annual conference of the Association for the Study of Higher 
Education in Portland, OR, November 2003.
Heller, D. (2002) State merit scholarship programs: An introduction. In D.E. Heller & P. 
Marin (Eds.), Who should we help? The negative consequences o f  merit 
scholarships (pp. 17-24). Cambridge, MA: The Civil Rights Project, Harvard 
University.
Heller, D.E. (1999). The effects of tuition and state financial aid on public college 
enrollment. Review o f  Higher Education, 23,65-89.
Heller, D.E. (1997). Student price response in higher education: An update to Leslie and 
Brinkman. Journal o f  Higher Education, 68, 624-659.
Heller, D.E., & Marin, P. (Eds.) (2004). State merit scholarship programs and racial 
inequality. Cambridge, MA: The Harvard Civil Rights Project at Harvard 
University.
Heller, D.E., & Marin, P. (Eds.). (2002). Who should we help? The negative social
consequences o f  merit scholarships. Cambridge, MA: The Civil Rights Project at 
Harvard University.
Heller, D.E. & Rasmussen (2002). M erit scholarships and college access: Evidence from  
Florida and Michigan. In D.E. Heller & P. Marin (Eds.), Who should we help? 
The negative consequences o f  merit scholarships (pp. 17-24). Cambridge, MA: 
The Civil Rights Project, Harvard University.
Heller, D.E. & Rogers, K. (2004). Shifting the burden: Public and private financing o f  
higher education in the United States and implications fo r  Europe. Paper
246
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
presented at the European Higher Education Society 26th Annual Forum, in 
Barcelona, Spain, September 2004.
Heller, D.E. & Rogers, K. (2003). M erit scholarships and incentives fo r  academic 
performance. Paper presented at the Association for the Study of Higher 
Education, Portland, Oregon, November, 2003.
Herzog, S. (2005). Measuring the impact of state-funded merit scholarship programs on 
student access and success; Evidence from the nation’s fastest growing state. 
Presentation at the Association for Institutional Research Forum, San Diego, CA, 
May 29-June1, 2005.
Holmes, M. D., Daudistel, H. C. & Taggart, W. A. (1992). Plea bargaining policy and 
state district court caseloads: An interrupted time series analysis. Law & Society 
Review. 26(1), 139-159.
Institute for Higher Education Policy (2005). Private scholarships count: Access to
higher education and the critical role of the private sector. Paper presentation at 
the 22nd Annual Student Financial Aid Research Network Conference, June 9 - 
11, 2005, Chicago, IE
Institute for Higher Education Policy (2005). How Latino students pay for college: 
Patterns in Financial Aid, 2003-04. Retrieved from 
http://www.ihep.org/Pubs/PDF/LatinoEng.pdf
Jackson, G. A. (1978). Financial aid and student enrollment. The Journal o f  Higher 
Education, 49(6), 548-574.
Kane, T.J. (1999). The price o f  admission: Rethinking how Americans pay fo r  college. 
Washington, D C., Brookings Institution Press.
247
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Kane, T. J. (2003). “A quasi-experimental estimate of the impact of financial aid on 
college-going.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9703.
Kim, D. (2004). The effect of financial aid on students’ college choice: Differences by 
racial group. Research in Higher Education, 45(1).
Klein, J. (1997). Statistical visions in time: A history o f  time series analysis, 1662-1938. 
New York, NY : Cambridge University Press.
Lewis-Beck, M. (1980). Applied regression: An introduction. Series: Quantitative 
applications in the social sciences. No. 22. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE 
Publications.
Long, B. T. (2003). “How do financial aid policies affect colleges? The institutional 
impact of the Georgia HOPE Scholarship.” Harvard Graduate School of 
Education and NBER (July 15, 2003 version).
Maag & Fitzpatrick (2004). Federal financial aid for higher education: Programs and 
prospects. Report for the Urban Institute.
Martinez, M. (2004).Postsecondary participation and state policy. Sterling, VA: Stylus 
Publishing.
McDowall, D., McLeary, R., Meidinger, E.E., & Hay, Jr. R.A. (1980). Interrupted time 
series analysis. Series: Quantitative applications in the social sciences. No. 21. 
Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications
McLendon, M.K., Heller, D.E., & Young, S.P. (2005). State postsecondary policy
innovation: Politics, competition, and the interstate migration of policy ideas. The 
Journal o f  Higher Education, 76 (4).
248
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Meier, K J. & Brudney, J.L. (2002). Applied statistics fo r  public administration.
Orlando, FL. Harcourt, Inc.
Meyer, B. D. (1995). Natural and quasi-experiments in economics. Journal o f  Business 
and Economic Statistics, 13(2).
Missouri Department of Higher Education (2006). Missouri Higher Education Academic 
"Bright Flight" Scholarship Program information sheet retrieved from 
http://www.dhe.mo. gov/hsstudentsbri ghtfli ght.shtml on July 17, 2006.
Mortenson, T. (2001). College participation by gender age 18 to 24, 1967 to 2000,
Postsecondary Education OPPORTUNITY Newsletter. Number 109, July 2001. 
National Center for Education Statistics (2006). Introduction to the Integrated 
Postsecondary Division. Retrieved from 
http://165.224.221.98/ipeds/AboutIPEDS.asp on July 12, 2006.
National Center for Higher Education Management Systems (NCHEMS) (2005). 
Retrieved from;
http://www.hi gheredinfo.org/dbrowser/index.php?submeasure=63&vear=2002&l 
evel^nation&mode=data&state=0 on November 27, 2005.
Ostrom, C. W. Jr. (1990). Time series analysis: regression techniques. Series:
Quantitative applications in the social sciences. No. 9. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE Publications.
Pema, L. W. & Titus, M. (2004). Understanding differences in the choice of college 
attended: The role of state public policies. The Review o f  Higher Education, 
27(4), pp. 501-525.
249
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ruppert, S. (2003). Closing the college participation gap: A national summary. 
Education Commission of the States Report.
Sayrs, L. (1989). Pooled time series analysis. Series: Quantitative applications in the 
social sciences, No. 70. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications.
Smart, J. (2005). Attributes of exemplary research manuscript employing quantitative 
analyses. Research in Higher Education, 46 (4), pp. 461-477.
South Carolina Commission on Higher Education (2006) Details outlining the 
scholarship guidelines. Retrieved on July 14, 2006 from 
http://www.che.sc.gov/New_Web/ForInstitutions/Scholarship_Guidelns.htm
StatSoft (2005) Electronic statistics book. Retrieved from
http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/sttimser.html, on November 25, 2005.
Stewart, M. A. & Post, P. (1990). Minority students’ perceptions of variables affecting 
their selection of a large university. Journal o f  Multicultural Counseling & 
Development, 18(4).
St. John, E. P. (1994). Prices, productivity, and investment: Assessing financial
strategies in higher education. ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Report No. 3. 
Washington, DC: The George Washington University.
St. John, E. P. (1991). The impact of student financial aid: A review of recent research. 
Journal o f  Student Financial Aid, 21(1), 18-32.
St. John, E. P. & Starkey, J. B. (1995) An alternative to net price: Assessing the influence 
of prices and subsidies on within-year persistence. The Journal o f  Higher 
Education, 66(2), 156-186.
250
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Stream, C. (1999). Health reform in the states: A model of state small group health 
insurance market reforms. Political Research Quarterly, 52(3), 499-525. 
Taggart, W. (1989). Redefining the power of the federal judiciary: The impact of court- 
ordered prison reform on state expenditures for corrections. Law & Society 
Review, 23(2).
Thistlethwaite, D. L. (1958). College-scholarship offers and the enrollment of talented 
students. The Journal o f  Higher Education, 29(8), 421-424, 467-468 
Thomas, S. L. (2003). Longer-term economic effects of college selectivity and control.
Research in Higher Education, 44(3).
Tierney, M. L. (1980). The impact of financial aid on student demand for public/private 
higher education. The Journal o f  Higher Education, 5 1 (5), 527-545 
Van der Klaauw, W. (2002). Estimating the effect of financial aid offers on college 
enrollment: A regression-discontinuity approach. International Economic 
Review, 43(4), 1249-1287.
Washington Higher Education Coordinating Board (2006). Retrieved from 
http ://www. hecb. wa. gov/financial aid/ wps/wpsindex. asp
251
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Graduate College 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Michelle Johanna Nilson
Local Address:
P.O. Box 70781
Las Vegas, Nevada 89170
Home Address:
9701 Fish Lake Road 
Holly, Michigan 48442
Degrees:
Bachelor of Arts, Biological Sciences, 1998 
Wayne State University, Detroit
Master of Arts, Educational Management and Development, 2003 
New Mexico State University, Las Cruces
Publications:
Martinez, M.C. & Nilson, M.J. (2006). Assessing the connection between higher 
education policy and performance. Educational Policy.
Dissertation Title: Evaluating the Effect of Merit Aid as a Higher Education Policy 
Tool Using Time Series Analysis
Dissertation Examination Committee:
Chairperson, Dr. Mario C. Martinez
Committee Member, Dr. Robert Ackerman
Committee Member: Dr. Mimi Wolverton
Graduate Faculty Representative: Dr. Christopher Stream, Ph.D.
252
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
